From 7cef6de826b18246dc893275c595c497520747e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: fairlighteth <31534717+fairlighteth@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2026 15:44:12 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 01/11] refactor: clean up MEV Blocker documentation

---
 docs/mevblocker/README.mdx                    |  41 +--
 docs/mevblocker/builders/README.mdx           |  39 ---
 docs/mevblocker/builders/_category_.json      |   6 -
 docs/mevblocker/builders/fees/_category_.json |   9 -
 .../fees/fee-management-smart-contract.md     |  72 -----
 .../builders/fees/subscription-fees.md        |  46 ----
 docs/mevblocker/builders/optimal_bidding.md   |  81 ------
 docs/mevblocker/builders/rules.md             |  21 --
 .../MEV/MEV Attacks/sandwich-attacks.md       |  38 ---
 .../MEV/MEV Attacks/what-is-backrunning.md    |  35 ---
 .../MEV/MEV Attacks/what-is-frontrunning.md   |  61 -----
 docs/mevblocker/concepts/MEV/MEV.md           |  33 ---
 docs/mevblocker/concepts/MEV/_category_.json  |   4 -
 docs/mevblocker/concepts/README.mdx           |  14 -
 docs/mevblocker/concepts/_category_.json      |   6 -
 docs/mevblocker/concepts/gas_rebates.md       |  24 --
 .../mevblocker/concepts/order-flow-auction.md |  67 -----
 .../API-reference/Cancelling-transactions.md  |  14 -
 .../API-reference/Sending-transactions.md     | 254 ------------------
 .../API-reference/Transactions-status.md      |  63 -----
 .../API-reference/analytics.md                |  15 --
 .../configuring-fee-recipient-address.md      |  15 --
 .../orderflow-originators/Endpoints.md        |  79 ------
 .../Integrators/Intent_applications.md        |  35 ---
 .../Integrators/Oracles.md                    |  35 ---
 .../Integrators/Relayers.md                   |  35 ---
 .../Integrators/Solvers.md                    |  29 --
 .../Integrators/Telegram Bots.md              |  29 --
 .../Integrators/Wallets.md                    |  33 ---
 .../orderflow-originators/Users/Metamask.md   |  20 --
 .../orderflow-originators/Users/README.mdx    |  30 ---
 .../orderflow-originators/Users/rabby.md      |  17 --
 .../orderflow-originators/Users/rainbow.md    |  17 --
 .../orderflow-originators/_category_.json     |   6 -
 docs/mevblocker/rpc-performance/README.mdx    |  28 --
 .../rpc-performance/_category_.json           |   6 -
 .../mevblocker/rpc-performance/backrunning.md |  25 --
 .../rpc-performance/inclusion-speed.md        |  24 --
 .../rpc-performance/price-improvement.md      |  25 --
 .../rpc-performance/success-reate.md          |  14 -
 .../searchers/API Reference/cancel_bundle.md  |  30 ---
 .../searchers/API Reference/send_bundle.md    |  35 ---
 docs/mevblocker/searchers/README.mdx          |  19 --
 docs/mevblocker/searchers/_category_.json     |   6 -
 .../searchers/bidding-on-transactions.md      | 104 -------
 .../searchers/listening-for-transactions.md   |  63 -----
 docusaurus.config.ts                          |  24 ++
 .../MevBlockerInterstitial.module.css         |  95 +++++++
 src/components/MevBlockerInterstitial.tsx     |  72 +++++
 src/theme/NotFound/index.tsx                  |  32 +++
 vercel.json                                   |   7 +-
 51 files changed, 235 insertions(+), 1697 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/builders/README.mdx
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/builders/_category_.json
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/builders/fees/_category_.json
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/builders/fees/fee-management-smart-contract.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/builders/fees/subscription-fees.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/builders/optimal_bidding.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/builders/rules.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/concepts/MEV/MEV Attacks/sandwich-attacks.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/concepts/MEV/MEV Attacks/what-is-backrunning.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/concepts/MEV/MEV Attacks/what-is-frontrunning.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/concepts/MEV/MEV.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/concepts/MEV/_category_.json
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/concepts/README.mdx
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/concepts/_category_.json
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/concepts/gas_rebates.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/concepts/order-flow-auction.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/API-reference/Cancelling-transactions.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/API-reference/Sending-transactions.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/API-reference/Transactions-status.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/API-reference/analytics.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/API-reference/configuring-fee-recipient-address.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Endpoints.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Integrators/Intent_applications.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Integrators/Oracles.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Integrators/Relayers.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Integrators/Solvers.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Integrators/Telegram Bots.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Integrators/Wallets.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Users/Metamask.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Users/README.mdx
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Users/rabby.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Users/rainbow.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/_category_.json
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/rpc-performance/README.mdx
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/rpc-performance/_category_.json
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/rpc-performance/backrunning.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/rpc-performance/inclusion-speed.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/rpc-performance/price-improvement.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/rpc-performance/success-reate.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/searchers/API Reference/cancel_bundle.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/searchers/API Reference/send_bundle.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/searchers/README.mdx
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/searchers/_category_.json
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/searchers/bidding-on-transactions.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/searchers/listening-for-transactions.md
 create mode 100644 src/components/MevBlockerInterstitial.module.css
 create mode 100644 src/components/MevBlockerInterstitial.tsx
 create mode 100644 src/theme/NotFound/index.tsx

diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/README.mdx b/docs/mevblocker/README.mdx
index 41940af38..9df400014 100644
--- a/docs/mevblocker/README.mdx
+++ b/docs/mevblocker/README.mdx
@@ -1,37 +1,8 @@
-# Overview
+---
+title: MEV Blocker
+description: MEV Blocker update notice and redirect.
+---
 
-## MEV Blocker is the #1 leading MEV-protection RPC solution by transaction volume and rebates.
+import MevBlockerInterstitial from '@site/src/components/MevBlockerInterstitial';
 
-![MEV Blocker](/img/mevblocker/concept1-1200x630.png)  
-
-### MEV Blocker is Built to:
-
-* Protect users from frontrunning & sandwich attacks (MEV Attacks)
-*  Give users/integrators a rebate from backrunning opportunities created by the their flow
-*  Provide the fastest inclusion time
-
-### Key Advantages
-
-The key advantages that MEV Blocker offers in comparison to other RPCs are the following
-
-* **Inclusion time →** MEV Blocker is the fastest RPC across the market due to it's innovative Builder fee mechanism.
-* **Backrun Rebates →**  MEV Blocker offers the highest rebates among RPCs thanks to its robust OFA and its decentralised Searcher network, which is why it gets the highest rebates in comparison to other RPCs
-* **Transparent →** All our data  is public within a 30 second delay.
-* **Customizable →** MEV Blocker offers five different RPC endpoints that users/integrators can choose from based on their individual needs.
-* **Permissionless →** All endpoints, and features are fully permissionless, no gate keeping.  MEV Blocker is built by experts to be user-friendly, easy to set up, and free for users to integrate.
-
-### MEV Blocker Beats the Competition
-
-Check out our RPC Benchmark Comparison study to see how MEV Blocker performs across speed, backruns, and success metrics.
-
-![Guide](/img/mevblocker/mevblocker_comparison.png)
-
-### [Comparison Study](/mevblocker/rpc-performance)
-
-### Supported Chains
-
-Ethereum: All features are supported on Ethereum.
-
-import DocCardList from '@theme/DocCardList';
-
-<DocCardList />
+<MevBlockerInterstitial />
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/builders/README.mdx b/docs/mevblocker/builders/README.mdx
deleted file mode 100644
index 6c118bb3e..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/builders/README.mdx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-# Builders
-
-Builders receiving MEV blocker transactions should adhere to certain rules and also pay a fee to MEV blocker. The proceeds of the fee are used to support MEV blocker technical development and drive continuous growth in users' adoption. 
-
-To connect to MEV Blocker and start receiving private order flow, builders must meet the following basic requirements:
-
-- **Build ≥1% of mainnet blocks consistently**  
-  You must have built at least 1% of Ethereum mainnet blocks *per week* during the past month.  
-  We reserve the right to disconnect builders who drop significantly below this threshold.
-
-- **Post a 10 ETH bond**  
-  A refundable security deposit is required to join the network.  
-  It is held in the MEV Blocker contract and covers potential penalties or late fees.
-
-- **Support for core features**  
-  Builders must implement:
-  - **Refund bundles**
-  - **`replacementUuid` (or `uuid`)** for updateable bundles
-  - **Tx hash dropping** (to support dynamic bundle resolution)
-
-- **Maintain ethical execution**  
-  Builders must refrain from any behavior that harms MEV Blocker users, including but not limited to:
-  - Frontrunning or sandwiching  
-  - Sharing or leaking transaction/state data  
-  - Selectively including transactions or manipulating refund outcomes
-
-- **No shadow identities or fee evasion**  
-  Builders must not attempt to bypass the fee mechanism by operating "shadow builders" or other manipulative schemes.
-
-- **Reach out to get started**  
-  Final onboarding and access to flow are coordinated via the MEV Blocker Telegram group.
-
----
-
-This is a high-level summary — each requirement is explained in detail in the sections that follow.
-
-import DocCardList from '@theme/DocCardList';
-
-<DocCardList />
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/builders/_category_.json b/docs/mevblocker/builders/_category_.json
deleted file mode 100644
index e48d93ee8..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/builders/_category_.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-{
-    "position": 4,
-    "label": "Builders",
-    "collapsible": true,
-    "collapsed": true
-}
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/builders/fees/_category_.json b/docs/mevblocker/builders/fees/_category_.json
deleted file mode 100644
index b67023b81..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/builders/fees/_category_.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-{
-    "position": 2,
-    "label": "Fees",
-    "collapsible": true,
-    "collapsed": true,
-    "link": {
-        "type": "generated-index"
-    }
-}
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/builders/fees/fee-management-smart-contract.md b/docs/mevblocker/builders/fees/fee-management-smart-contract.md
deleted file mode 100644
index a24ad5abf..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/builders/fees/fee-management-smart-contract.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
----
-sidebar_position: 2
----
-
-# Builder Fee Management Smart Contract
-
-The contract's source code is available on [GitHub](https://github.com/cowprotocol/mev-blocker-till/) and is deployed at [`0x08cd77feb3fb28cc1606a91e0ea2f5e3eaba1a9a`](https://etherscan.io/address/0x08cd77feb3fb28cc1606a91e0ea2f5e3eaba1a9a#code).
-
-The MEV Blocker Fee Management Smart Contract provides a framework for managing financial interactions between builders and the MEV Blocker service. This documentation guides builders through the process of engaging with MEV Blocker, from making initial deposits, to managing subscription fees, and eventually withdrawing their deposits if they choose to disconnect.
-
-## Contract Overview
-
-The smart contract is designed to handle:
-- **Deposits** (bonds) from builders wishing to receive transaction order flow from MEV Blocker
-- **Weekly billing** of subscription fees
-- **Advertising** the price of the subscription
-- **Payment** of dues by builders
-- **Withdrawal** of deposits by builders who wish to disconnect
-
-## Key Functionalities
-
-### Joining MEV Blocker
-Builders interested in joining must call the `join` function with a deposit of 10 ETH (or the specified initial bond amount). This deposit acts as a bond to cover potential late fees and penalties.
-
-**Function to Use:**
-```solidity
-function join() payable external
-```
-
-### Billing and Subscription Fees
-MEV Blocker will use the `bill` function on a weekly basis to update the bills of subscribed builders for the previous period and update the subscription fee for the next period. The new price will be applied as of the next block. The current price can be queried at any time.
-
-**Functions for MEV Blocker billers:**
-```solidity
-function bill(address[] calldata ids, uint256[] calldata due, uint256 newPrice) external onlyBiller
-```
-
-Builders are responsible for monitoring their dues and ensuring timely payment through the `pay` function.
-Bills remaining unpaid for >24h will result in the corresponding builder being disconnected. 
-
-**Function for Builders:**
-```solidity
-function pay(address id) payable external
-```
-
-### Managing Dues and Withdrawals
-Builders wishing to disconnect from MEV Blocker must first signal their intention by calling the `nope` function. After a waiting period of 7 days, they may withdraw their bond by invoking the `exit` function, provided all dues have been settled.
-
-**Functions for Exiting:**
-```solidity
-function nope() external
-function exit() external
-```
-
-### Handling Forced Payments and Penalties
-The contract owner has the authority to withdraw from bonds or impose fines on builders for violations of the rules set forth by MEV Blocker.
-The `fine` function includes a `to` address which facilitates direct reimbursement to affected parties.
-
-**Functions for Contract Owner:**
-```solidity
-function draft(address id, uint256 amt) external onlyOwner
-function fine(address id, uint256 amt, address to) external onlyOwner
-```
-
-## Usage Guide for Builders
-
-1. **Making the Initial Deposit:** To participate, send a transaction with 10 ETH to the `join` function of the contract.
-2. **Monitoring Subscription Fees:** Keep an eye on the advertised subscription fee and ensure sufficient funds are available to cover weekly dues.
-3. **Paying Dues:** Use the `pay` function to settle your weekly dues. Ensure the correct amount is sent to avoid any disruptions in service.
-4. **Withdrawing Deposits:** If you decide to disconnect, call `nope` to signal your intention. After 7 days, you can withdraw your deposit through the `exit` function, assuming all dues are cleared.
-
-This documentation is intended to facilitate a smooth and informed engagement with the MEV Blocker service by builders. For further assistance or inquiries, builders are encouraged to contact the MEV Blocker team.
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/builders/fees/subscription-fees.md b/docs/mevblocker/builders/fees/subscription-fees.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 78c613c2c..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/builders/fees/subscription-fees.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
----
-sidebar_position: 1
----
-
-# The Fee
-
-All builders connected to MEV Blocker will pay a per-block-won fee recomputed every period (for example, every month). In practice, at the beginning of period $t$ a builder decides whether to receive flow from MEV Blocker. If it decides to do so, for every block won during period $t$, it will pay a per-block fee calculated as a percentage of the average per-block-won value of MEV Blocker transactions during the previous period. Mathematically, the per-block fee for period $t$ is a percentage of:
-
-$$ M_{t-1} = {A_{t-1}-B_{t-1} \over C_{t-1}} $$
-
-Where
-
-$A_{t-1}$  = Total MEV Blocker transaction value during period $t-1$, excluding rebates.
-$B_{t-1}$  = Total value of MEV Blocker transactions also in the mempool during period $t-1$.
-$C_{t-1}$  = Number of blocks mined by builders receiving MEV Blocker transactions during period $t-1$.
-
-Currently, the fee is 50% of the above value, and the length of the period is one month. Builders who wish to connect or disconnect should announce their intention at least 48 hours before the beginning of the new period (i.e., 24 hours before the fee update).
-
-:::note Off-chain accounting
-
-Despite the fact that the fee is per block, it is not paid with each block: we keep track of it off-chain and settle it weekly. Hence, the settlement period for the payment (one week) differs from the frequency at which the per-block won fee is computed (one month). Builders are expected to settle their payment within 24 hours from the beginning of the new settlement period using the dedicated [smart contract](fee-management-smart-contract).
-
-:::
-
-We compute the value of the per-block won fee using publicly available data, in a format that is easy to verify (a Dune query). The process for [posting](fee-management-smart-contract#billing-and-subscription-fees) this value on-chain, as well as posting builders' dues and payment is documented below in the [smart contract section](fee-management-smart-contract).
-
-Finally, for builders who won fewer than 1% of blocks during a given week, the fee is adjusted so that these builders pay as if they won exactly 1% of blocks during the week. In practice, at the end of each week, these builders pay:
-
-$$ 1\% (total\ blocks\ mined\ during\ the\ previous\ week) * 50\% M_{t-1} $$
-
-The rationale for this adjustment is that connecting a builder to MEV Blocker poses a risk because of the potential leaking of transactions to the public mempool, which should be evaluated against the benefit of faster inclusion of MEV Blocker transactions. We believe the risk outweighs the benefit for builders who win less than 1% of blocks. Although we do not want to penalize builders who may temporarily fall below this threshold too harshly, we also want to discourage builders who pose a risk to the MEV Blocker service from connecting in the first place.
-
-# Reasoning behind the Fee
-
-## Why this fee mechanism?
-
-An intuitive notion of fairness dictates that each builder should pay for the value of MEV Blocker transactions it uses. At the same time, an important objective of the mechanism is to be as non-distortionary as possible: it should not affect a builder's decision to include or not include a transaction. The above fee mechanism is unlikely to create distortions: an MEV-blocker-connected builder who wins the block pays the same fee independently of which MEV blocker transactions it uses and in which order. It is also built to be correct *on average*: if builders do not disconnect and win more or less the same fraction of blocks between periods, they pay with a month delay the average value of MEV transactions they received during the previous week. Last, but not least, its goal is to reduce the payment from builders to validators (i.e., MEV), as we explain below.
-
-## Who pays the fee?
-
-To understand the fee incidence, we need to consider two cases. If a single builder receives MEV Blocker flow, introducing the fee is at the expense of this builder's profits: the builder pays, on average, 20% of the value of MEV transactions as a fee while keeping the remaining 80% as profits. On the other hand, suppose that all builders are connected to MEV Blocker, so they all have to pay for it. Now, for all builders, winning a block is less valuable by an amount equal to the fee. For the moment, let's think of the auction as a second-price auction: the winning builder is the one who bids the highest but only pays the second-highest bid. One of the most famous results in auction theory is that, in a second-price auction, bidders should bid their true valuation, which for each builder is the value of its block minus the MEV Blocker fee. This implies that the winning bidder earns the value of its block minus MEV Blocker fee, and pays in the auction the second-highest bid, which is the second most valuable block minus the MEV Blocker fee. Hence, the winning builder earns less but pays less, and its profit margin remains the same. In equilibrium, the only impact of MEV Blocker's fee is that all bids are lower, and hence, payments to validators are lower: the fee is paid indirectly by the validator.
-
-Note that the PBS auction is not exactly a second-price auction. It starts as an ascending English auction, where bidders gradually increase their bids. Due to latency, the final part is similar to a first-price sealed bid auction. Despite these complexities, the auction's dynamics are similar to a second-price auction because each builder aims to outbid the second-highest bid by a small margin. Also, since the value a builder gets from creating a block doesn't depend on other builders' blocks (i.e., the auction is in private values), the revenue equivalence theorem says that all auction formats yield the same expected payoff to its participants. Hence, even if the auction is not in second price, we can analyze its equilibrium as if it were in second price.
-
-To summarize, if most builders connect to MEV Blocker, then the fee reduces the payments to validators (i.e., MEV). At the same time,  the mechanism is beneficial to builders overall, including in cases where only one or a few builders connect (and end up paying the fee out of their profits).
-
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/builders/optimal_bidding.md b/docs/mevblocker/builders/optimal_bidding.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 99d4ce021..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/builders/optimal_bidding.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
----
-sidebar_position: 3
----
-
-# Optimal Bidding
-
-## Bidding Strategy for MEV Blocker-Connected Builders
-
-To effectively compete in the block builder market, a builder connected to MEV Blocker must understand how to account for the MEV Blocker fee when setting bids. This guide outlines how to incorporate that cost into your bidding strategy under various flow scenarios.
-
-### Setup & Assumptions
-
-We simplify the environment to make the strategy intuitive — the conclusions still hold in expectation beyond these assumptions.
-
-- Public Mempool Flow: 1 ETH per block (always available to all builders)
-- Private Flow:  
-  - With 50% probability, a block contains a MEV Blocker tx worth 1 ETH  
-  - With 50% probability, a block contains a Private RPC tx worth 1 ETH
-- Builders:
-  - Builders A & B are connected to MEV Blocker and other Private RPC
-  - Builder C is only connected to the public mempool
-- MEV Blocker Cost: 0.1 ETH per block won — fixed fee regardless of block content
-- Private RPC Cost: 90% of transaction value, paid only if a Private RPC tx is included
-
-No other MEV is assumed, and builders are not subsidizing their bids.
-
-### The Key Principle
-
-If you are connected to MEV Blocker, you must adjust your bid for each block you win by subtracting 0.1 ETH, regardless of which transactions are in that block. This is because the MEV Blocker fee is charged per block won, not per transaction included. To remain competitive and avoid losses, you must lower your bid to reflect this fixed cost.
-
-###  Optimal Bidding by Scenario
-Let’s walk through what your bid should look like depending on the transactions present in the block.
-
-#### Scenario 1: Public mempool + MEV Blocker + Private RPC transactions
-
-- Total Value: 1 + 1 + 1 = 3 ETH
-- MEV Blocker Fee: 0.1 ETH
-- Private RPC Fee: 0.9 ETH (90% of 1 ETH)
-- Adjusted Bid: 3 - 0.1 - 0.9 = 2 ETH
-
-You win over builders without private flow (who can only bid 1 ETH).
-
-#### Scenario 2: Public mempool + MEV Blocker Transactions
-
-- Total Value: 1 + 1 = 2 ETH
-- MEV Blocker Fee: 0.1 ETH
-- Adjusted Bid: 2 - 0.1 = 1.9 ETH
-
-Still beats the public-only builder who bids up to 1 ETH.
-
-#### Scenario 3: Public mempool + Private RPC Transactions
-
-- Total Value: 1 + 1 = 2 ETH
-- MEV Blocker Fee: 0.1 ETH (paid even if no MEV Blocker tx)
-- Private RPC Fee: 0.9 ETH
-- Adjusted Bid: 2 - 0.1 - 0.9 = 1 ETH
-
-Your access to Private RPC gives you edge despite the MEV Blocker fee.
-
-#### Scenario 4: Public mempool Only transactions
-
-- Total Value: 1 ETH
-- MEV Blocker Fee: 0.1 ETH
-- Adjusted Bid: 1 - 0.1 = 0.9 ETH
-
-Public-only builders can bid up to 1 ETH — you’ll lose these blocks in rare cases, but MEV Blocker’s fee is carefully calibrated to ensure this happens infrequently.
-
-#### Summary
-
-| Scenario                        | Value in Block | Builder Cost        | Optimal Bid | Outcome                     |
-|---------------------------------|----------------|----------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|
-| MEV Blocker + Private RPC + Pub | 3 ETH          | 0.1 + 0.9 ETH        | 2.0 ETH     | You win                     |
-| MEV Blocker + Public            | 2 ETH          | 0.1 ETH              | 1.9 ETH     | You win                     |
-| Private RPC + Public            | 2 ETH          | 0.1 + 0.9 ETH        | 1.0 ETH     | You win                     |
-| Public only                     | 1 ETH          | 0.1 ETH              | 0.9 ETH     | You lose (non-connected wins) |
-
-## Conclusion
-
-Always factor the 0.1 ETH MEV Blocker fee into your bid — even if the block has no MEV Blocker txs.
-
-You’re never at a net loss in expectation when following this strategy correctly. You're simply shifting value from validators to MEV Blocker as the builder.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/builders/rules.md b/docs/mevblocker/builders/rules.md
deleted file mode 100644
index d6b10a325..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/builders/rules.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
----
-sidebar_position: 1
----
-
-# Rules
-
-The basic technical requirement to start receiving flow is to build at least 1% of the blocks each week of the previous month. We reserve the right to disconnect a builder who drops significantly below the 1% threshold while connected to MEV Blocker. Also, the fee will always be calculated as if the builder won at least 1% of blocks (see the discussion about the fee adjustment below).
-
-Connected builders who support refund bundles and replacementUuid (or uuid) for updateable bundles receive MEV Blocker transactions and bundles immediately. These builders should maximize the refunds received by MEV blocker's users. In particular, they should, for each transaction, always include the highest-paying bundles plus other bundles that do not fail (in the combination that maximizes the refund). If they comply with this rule, they can perform additional blind, end-of-block backrunning.
-
-Connected builders who do not support refund bundles will receive transactions with a delay. The purpose is to give time for searchers connected to MEV Blocker to create bundles. These builders *cannot perform any backrunning, that is, they cannot use or share any state related to MEV Blocker’s transactions for the purpose of exploiting a backrunning opportunity.*
-
-Independent of their support for bundles, all builders connected to MEV Blocker are expected to:
-
-- **Refrain from unethical activities that may hurt MEV Blocker users.** This includes (but is not limited to): frontrunning, sandwiching, and state or transaction sharing/leaking in any form.
-- **Refrain from actions having the sole purpose of gaming the rules or avoiding paying the fee.** This includes (but is not limited to) creating a separate identity (a "shadow builder") that only receives MEV Blocker flow.
-- **Deposit a 10 ETH bond in the MEV Blocker smart contract, administered by MEV Blocker implementing partners.** These funds will be used to cover late fees and penalties. They will be returned to builders who decide to disconnect from MEV Blocker and are in good standing.
-
-We reserve the right to disconnect builders suspected of violating these rules. If wrongdoing was established, we reserve the right to charge the violating builder any damage caused and require a re-subscription fee of 2 ETH. For example, suppose a builder included only one bundle when it was possible to include two bundles for the same transaction, hence failing to maximize the refund. Such a builder may be asked to pay as damage the reward from the missing bundle (plus the reconnection fee).
-
-
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/concepts/MEV/MEV Attacks/sandwich-attacks.md b/docs/mevblocker/concepts/MEV/MEV Attacks/sandwich-attacks.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 7fbe3d1f9..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/concepts/MEV/MEV Attacks/sandwich-attacks.md	
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
----
-sidebar_position: 5
----
-
-# What is a Sandwich Attack?
-
-[Sandwich attacks](https://twitter.com/CoWSwap/status/1498678005777973249?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1498678005777973249%7Ctwgr%5Ea123df70c36d1c50e8751632901e8fe95f16372e%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fcdn.embedly.com%2Fwidgets%2Fmedia.html%3Ftype%3Dtext2Fhtmlkey%3Da19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07schema%3Dtwitterurl%3Dhttps3A%2F%2Ftwitter.com%2FCoWSwap%2Fstatus%2F14986780057779732493Fs3D20image%3Dhttps3A%2F%2Fi.embed.ly%2F1%2Fimage3Furl3Dhttps253A252F252Fabs.twimg.com252Ferrors252Flogo46x38.png26key3Da19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07) occur when a user's transaction gets trapped, or "sandwiched," between two hostile transactions - one before and one after. As a result, the original transaction executes at a much higher price than necessary, leading to an inflated price for the original trader and a profit for the malicious trader placing the two extra trades (known as a "searcher").
-
-## How a sandwich attack works
-
-When a searcher spots an opportunity to sandwich a transaction, they place a trade before (known as "frontrunning") and a trade after (known as "backrunning") the transaction in order to manipulate the price of the trade.
-
-Due to the design of Automated Market Makers (AMM) such as Uniswap, these trades strategically manipulate the price of the assets, leaving room for profit. To really understand how sandwich attacks work, though, we first need to understand some core concepts.
-
-
-## Core concepts at play
-
-* **Automated Market Makers (AMM):** Automated Market Makers are trading mechanisms that allow traders to buy and sell assets in real time. Unlike traditional "orderbook" trading, which relies on counterparties for every transaction (you need a seller in order to buy and a buyer in order to sell), AMMs work by maintaining a constant ratio between the prices of two assets. For example, ETH and COW. AMMs use the formula "x*y = k" to determine a fair price based on the ratio between two assets (x and y) in the liquidity pool. Any time a trade alters this ratio by depleting the supply of one asset and increasing the other, the prices of the assets adjust in order to preserve the established ratio. For instance, if a trader buys COW and sells ETH, the COW price rises, and the ETH price falls. The opposite happens when traders sell COW and buy ETH.
-
-* **Slippage Tolerance:** When placing a trade, traders set a "slippage tolerance" for their transactions, which represents the maximum price difference they're willing to accept for their trade. For example, if ETH is trading at \$2,000 and you place an order to buy ETH with a 5% slippage tolerance, you're willing to buy ETH at up to \$2,100. If ETH goes above \$2,100, however, your trade will fail, as it's outside your slippage tolerance. Some slippage tolerance is always necessary because the prices of crypto assets are constantly fluctuating, so by the time your trade executes, the price may have moved. Setting your slippage tolerance too high, however, leaves room for searchers to sandwich your trades.
-
-* **Price Impact:** Crypto markets, like all markets, are based on supply and demand. AMMs maintain "liquidity pools" of assets that they use to fill trades. Each trade drains some amount of this liquidity, moving the price of the asset. This price movement is known as "price impact." The larger the trade, the bigger the price impact. A trade of \$100 ETH will not move the price of ETH very noticeably, since it makes up a tiny fraction of the available liquidity. A trade of \$1,000,000 ETH however, will noticeably move the price of ETH.
-
-* **Transaction Reordering:** Blockchain transactions do not always enter the block in the order that they were submitted. Searchers can "bribe" the validator responsible for creating the block to have them arrange transactions in a specific sequence. This transaction reordering is what makes all of MEV, including sandwich attacks, possible.
-
-## The sandwich attack: Step by step
-
-Let's examine a sandwich attack through a step-by-step example. In this example, we're trading ETH and COW.
-
-![Sandwich](/img/mevblocker/Sandwich_Attack.webp)
-
-1. Bessie wants to buy COW using her ETH. She goes to a decentralized exchange (DEX) like Uniswap, and places an order for 4,000 COW. This should cost her around 1 ETH, but due to significant market volatility, Bessie decides to set a 10% slippage tolerance. This means she's willing to pay up to 1.1 ETH for 4,000 COW.
-2. Bessie's trade enters the Ethereum mempool (the pending order queue), and a lurking searcher spots an opportunity. Springing into action, the searcher places a trade just before Bessie's large enough to push the COW price up to her slippage tolerance. In this case, the searcher buys 4,000 COW for exactly 1 ETH. As a result of this first trade's price impact, Bessie's 4,000 COW purchase now costs 1.1 ETH - the maximum she's willing to pay.
-3. Once the searcher's transaction clears, Bessie's transaction also goes through and she receives her 4,000 COW in exchange for 1.1 ETH. The searcher takes advantage of this price impact and sells their original COW at this new rate - 4,000 COW for 1.1 ETH. In the end, the searcher buys 4,000 COW for 1 ETH and sells it for 1.1 ETH, earning a profit of 0.1 ETH (before gas and fees) for not much effort.
-
-It's easy to see how lucrative sandwich attacks are!
-
-Bessie, on the other hand, ends up with a bad deal. She could have purchased 4,000 COW for just 1 ETH, but her slippage tolerance left room for a sandwich attack that forced her to pay an extra 10% for her trade.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/concepts/MEV/MEV Attacks/what-is-backrunning.md b/docs/mevblocker/concepts/MEV/MEV Attacks/what-is-backrunning.md
deleted file mode 100644
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--- a/docs/mevblocker/concepts/MEV/MEV Attacks/what-is-backrunning.md	
+++ /dev/null
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----
-sidebar_position: 4
----
-
-# What is Backrunning?
-
-Backrunning is a specific type of MEV (Maximal Extractable Value) which causes traders to miss out on potential profit from their trades.
-
-In practice, backrunning involves strategically executing a transaction immediately after another, high-value transaction. By doing this, the backrunning transaction capitalizes on the arbitrage opportunity left over from the [price impact](https://blog.cow.fi/cow-protocol-glossary-ad7313a2c71#:~:text=price%20impact) of the initial transaction.
-
-![backrunning](/img/mevblocker/backrunning.webp)
-
-Backrunning involves the tactical use of the information contained within the Ethereum mempool - a holding area for all pending transactions - to place transactions immediately after high-value trades in order to profit.
-
-Out of the three types of MEV (frontrunning, sandwich attacks, and backrunning) backrunning is considered the least harmful. In fact, if performed by itself, this method simply captures the arbitrage opportunity left over by a large trade without affecting the initial trade itself. Backrunning is only harmful to the user when combined with a frontrunning attack, which results in the worst kind of MEV - the sandwich attack.
-
-For advanced traders who are capable of capturing the leftover arbitrage from their trades, backrunning may be considered a missed opportunity since it is money left on the table.
-
-Thankfully, not everyone has to be an experienced trader to capture the backrunning profits from their trades. Retail traders can automatically benefit from backrunning opportunities through specialized RPC endpoints such as MEV Blocker.
-
-## How backrunning works
-
-The most common perpetrators of backrunning are MEV bots programmed to monitor pending Ethereum transactions. These bots place strategic trades directly after existing trades in order to capture the arbitrage left over from their price impact.
-
-The process takes advantage of the mechanisms of [automated market makers (AMMs)](https://blog.cow.fi/cow-protocol-glossary-ad7313a2c71#:~:text=price%20impact). Whenever a large trade goes through, it imbalances the liquidity pools of the AMM, causing the price of the asset being sold to go down, and the price of the asset being bought to go up. This price imbalance leaves an arbitrage that MEV bots correct by placing a follow-up trade, earning a profit in the process.
-
-### Backrunning example
-
-To better understand the concept of backrunning, let's consider an example scenario. In this example, a user named Alex initiates a substantial trade, selling \$10,000 of ETH to buy COW on Uniswap. Due to the nature of AMMs, this swap leads to a jump in the value of COW and a drop in the value of ETH on this particular exchange (Uniswap).
-
-At the same time, an MEV bot notices Alex's large transaction and springs into action. The MEV bot acquires Alex's sell token (ETH) at this lower price and immediately turns around and sells it for a higher price on a different exchange where this price arbitrage has not yet been reflected. The bot profits from the price difference between the assets on these two exchanges.
-
-From a technical perspective, Alex's transaction doesn't result in any realized loss for him, since he still got the price he was quoted for his trade. However, his trade created an arbitrage opportunity that he didn't capture, leaving money on the table.
-
-The actions of the MEV bot have broader implications for the DeFi ecosystem. Bots monopolize arbitrage opportunities between exchanges and deny regular users the chance to benefit from the price impact their trades create.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/concepts/MEV/MEV Attacks/what-is-frontrunning.md b/docs/mevblocker/concepts/MEV/MEV Attacks/what-is-frontrunning.md
deleted file mode 100644
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--- a/docs/mevblocker/concepts/MEV/MEV Attacks/what-is-frontrunning.md	
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----
-
-sidebar_position: 3
-
----
-
-# What is Frontrunning?
-
-MEV, or maximal extractable value, is a hidden tax on Ethereum transactions that has been responsible for over a billion dollars in value loss for traders to date.
-
-Frontrunning is a particular type of MEV that affects all forms of Ethereum transactions including trades, NFT mints, and more. This article is part of a series on MEV where we also cover the other two common types of MEV: sandwich attacks and backrunning.
-
-## What is frontrunning and how does it work?
-
-Frontrunning occurs when a user makes a transaction but gets "frontrun" by an MEV bot who makes the same transactions ahead of them.
-
-![Frontrunning](/img/mevblocker/Frontrunning_1.webp)
-
-## The Frontrunning Process
-
-Frontrunning takes advantage of the open nature of the blockchain mempool, as anyone can view transactions. MEV bots exploit this transparency to hijack trades. Here's a basic rundown of the process:
-
-*  **Monitoring Pending Transactions:** The first step involves monitoring the blockchain network's mempool, a holding area for pending transactions. Here, frontrunners, who are often sophisticated bots, scan the mempool to identify transactions that can carry significant value that they want to snatch away or that could influence the price of a particular asset.
-
-*  **Selecting Profitable Transactions:** The frontrunner will analyze the potential market impact once such a transaction is identified. For instance, if a large buy order for a specific token is detected, the frontrunner knows that this transaction could increase the asset's price once processed.
-
-*  **Placing a New Transaction:** The frontrunner will initiate their buy order for the same asset, intending to get their transaction processed before the initially detected transaction. They typically give the validators a higher "tip" to execute their transaction first in the block in comparison to the target transaction.
-
-## Example: Frontrunning in DeFi
-
-A notable example of DeFi frontrunning involves the notorious MEV bot named "jaredfromsubway.eth." In one case, a user, [0x3a7822](https://zeromev.org/block?num=17508508), intended to trade 2 ETH for another token, $BOB.
-
-### How the frontrunning attack was executed
-
-This trade was noticed by the bot jaredfromsubway.eth, which monitored the mempool for transactions it could take advantage of.
-
-Once the transaction entered the mempool, jaredfromsubway.eth quickly executed its own transaction to buy \$BOB with ETH, strategically placing it as the first transaction in the block, and knowing that he would get the assets at a discount as the transactions behind will increase the price of \$BOB. MEV allows validators to prioritize transactions that are of the most value to them. Consequently, the bot's transaction, being the first one in the block, was confirmed ahead of the user's transaction.
-
-![Frontrunning](/img/mevblocker/Frontrunning_2.webp) 
-
-### The consequences of the frontrunning attack
-
-The frontrunning attack triggered an increase in the price of \$BOB tokens due to the additional demand created before the user's transaction was processed. When the user's original order of 145M \$BOB was executed, it was conducted at this now-inflated price, leading to user 0x3a7822 receiving significantly fewer \$BOB tokens, hence losing out on the value they could have otherwise captured.
-
-Jaredfromsubway.eth completed its MEV attack by selling its \$BOB tokens at an increased price, resulting in a profit, a second move that turned this MEV attack into a sandwich attack. In this scenario, the price impact triggered by the frontrunning bot meant that user 0x3a7822 encountered a worse trade-off, ultimately making a loss while the MEV bot profited — an estimated gain of 0.1 ETH.
-
-## How Harmful is Frontrunning?
-
-While frontrunning may seem harmless or even clever to some, it can adversely affect individual traders and compromise the overall integrity of the Ethereum network.
-
-### Impact on traders
-
-Frontrunning disrupts the fair operation of financial markets. By exploiting pending transactions, frontrunners manipulate market conditions to their benefit. This can lead to distorted prices, impacting regular traders who abide by market rules. What's more, these traders miss out on the value they would have otherwise derived from their trades. But most importantly, frontrunning attacks keep users from receiving the full value of their trades.
-
-### Long-term market consequences
-
-Over time, persistent frontrunning can erode market confidence. As traders realize they are consistently at a disadvantage due to frontrunning, they may lose faith in the integrity of the market and choose to leave. This could result in diminished market participation and liquidity, both of which are critical for overall market health and efficiency.
-
-### Network effects
-
-Frontrunning can also have wider implications for the underlying network. It can cause network congestion, since unnecessary transactions in a block slow down transaction processing times.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/concepts/MEV/MEV.md b/docs/mevblocker/concepts/MEV/MEV.md
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----
-sidebar_position: 3
----
-
-MEV is a controversial topic within any chain. MEV Blocker’s goal is to diminish all the MEV that hurts or goes against the users, while maximizing all the MEV that can work to the advantage of the user. 
-
-## **Without MEV Blocker**
-
-Ethereum’s default mempool is a wild west where MEV bots (aka searchers) can exploit transactions of unsuspecting traders (aka your users) taking their money bit by bit over time
-
-![image.png](/img/mevblocker/mevblocker_1.png)
-
-1. The wallet submits user-initiated txs to the public mempool.
-2. Anyone can view mempool txs. Builders select them based on fees and value.
-3. MEV bots exploit mempool transactions for profit, targeting slippage exploitation.
-4. MEV bots create bundles and submit them to builders with a bribe to enforce the order.
-5. Builders assemble the most valuable bundles to create the most profitable block for validators.
-6. Validators choose the most valuable block from builders to maximize earnings. Once selected, all txs (user, MEV, bribes) are executed onchain.
-
-## **With MEV Blocker**
-
-The structured mempool incentivizes searchers to bundle transactions for builders so they’re included in the next block without frontrunning or sandwiching traders (by giving searchers a cut of backrun opportunities)
-
-![image.png](/img/mevblocker/mevblocker_2.png)
-
-1. The wallet submits user-initiated txs to MEV Blocker’s virtual mempool.
-2. Builders must pay a subscription fee to access MEV Blocker's tx flow.
-3. Connected builders can access MEV Blocker flow and select txs based on fees and value.
-4. MEV Blocker shares txs with searchers via backrun bundles, returning 90% to the user.
-5. MEV bots create bundles and submit them to builders with a bribe to enforce the order.
-6. Builders assemble the most valuable bundles to create the most profitable block for validators.
-7. Validators choose the most valuable block from builders to maximize earnings. Once selected, all txs (user, MEV, bribes) are executed onchain.
-8. MEV Blocker shares 50% of the subscription fee from builders with wallet flow originators.
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/concepts/MEV/_category_.json b/docs/mevblocker/concepts/MEV/_category_.json
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-{
-    "position": 3,
-    "label": "MEV"
-}
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/concepts/README.mdx b/docs/mevblocker/concepts/README.mdx
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----
-sidebar_position: 1
----
-# Concepts
-
-MEV Blocker's order flow auction protects user transactions from frontrunning and sandwich attacks — the worst types of MEV — by sending transactions to a private mempool of trusted searchers. These searchers then capture any backrunning opportunities left by user transactions and give up to 90% of their value back to the users.
-
-- **MEV Protection**: Public mempool transactions are vulnerable to MEV attacks like frontrunning and sandwich attacks, causing millions in weekly losses. MEV Blocker's private pool protects you from these type of attacks.
-- **MEV Rebates**: MEV Blocker lets searchers bid to backrun transactions, returning 90% as user rebates and using 10% to reward builders and validators, reclaiming value and enabling wallet and dApp revenue.
-- **Faster Transaction Inclusion**: MEV Blocker bypasses the public Ethereum mempool, forwarding transactions directly to major builders for quicker inclusion.
-
-import DocCardList from '@theme/DocCardList';
-
-<DocCardList />
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/concepts/_category_.json b/docs/mevblocker/concepts/_category_.json
deleted file mode 100644
index ba8767b72..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/concepts/_category_.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-{
-    "position": 1,
-    "label": "Concepts",
-    "collapsible": true,
-    "collapsed": true
-}
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/concepts/gas_rebates.md b/docs/mevblocker/concepts/gas_rebates.md
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----
-sidebar_position: 2
----
-
-# Gas Rebates
-
-## **Introduction to Ethereum Gas Fees**
-
-All Ethereum transaction require a gas fee to get included onchain. This gas fee can be broken down into two categories: 
-
-- **Base Fee**: A required network fee that automatically adjusts based on network demand for blockspace. The baseFee ensures that if transactions pay such fee, they are processed and included in a block.
-- **Priority Fee**: An optional additional payment for builders to include your transaction faster than others. The priorityFee allows builders to tip make a more valuable block and hence, gives you a higher chance of fast inclusion in a block.
-
-## **How MEV Blocker Recovers Priority Fees**
-
-MEV blocker is the only RPC that has a permissionless Order Flow Auction for which both searchers and builders are bound to public rules. To this date, MEV Blocker processes around 10% of dailty Etherem transcations, and 
-
-MEV Blocker currently protects and routes over 20% of all Ethereum mainnet transactions daily. It maintains strong relationships with top block builders — the entities responsible for selecting and packaging transactions into Ethereum blocks.
-
-Through our wide-reaching network and direct integration with the transaction path, MEV Blocker is able to recover part of the Priority Fee that would otherwise be lost — all without introducing delays or compromising transaction speed.
-
-As Ethereum evolves under the Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) model, where validators (proposers) and block builders have distinct roles, gas pricing dynamics are shifting. While this opens the door for a more transparent and efficient fee market, users still often overspend to secure inclusion.
-
-MEV Blocker steps in to bridge that gap — helping users recapture the excess between what they paid and what was actually needed, effectively unlocking refunds from the inefficiencies of the current gas fee system.
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/concepts/order-flow-auction.md b/docs/mevblocker/concepts/order-flow-auction.md
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----
-sidebar_position: 1
----
-
-# How it works
-
-MEV Blocker's transaction flow can be broken down into 6 main steps. The image below shows a general overview of the flow of a transaction.
-
-![The Best Protection Under the Sun](/img/mevblocker/mevblocker_ofa.png)
-
-### 1. Builders pay subscription fee and connect to MEV Blocker
-
-Connected builders pay a weekly fee for MEV Blocker access, calculated per block won as a percentage of the previous period's average per-block value of MEVBlocker flow. The fee is computed monthly and posted onchain weekly, and is based on verifiable public data (e.g., Dune query).
-
-### 2. Order Flow Originators connect to MEV Blocker RPC Endpoint/s
-
-Order flow originators can submit transactions via public endpoints without an API key or third-party permission.
-
-### 3 MEV Blocker Private Mempool Action - Hiding txs from searchers
-
-MEV Blocker RPC shares the transaction (without signature) with a permissioned or permission-less set of searchers (depending on the endpoint). It enhances security by mixing real and AI-generated fake transactions together.
-
-Depending on the type of transaction, additional details may be hidden:  
-
-- In the case of swaps, MEV Blocker removes some sensitive information (such as slippage tolerance) from the transaction, preventing sandwich attacks
-
-- If the transaction is unlikely to receive a backrun, MEV Blocker doesn't share it with searchers at all 
-
-In a permissionless environment, searchers can’t be prevented from misusing shared data, so fake transactions add uncertainty to the data. Since searchers can’t distinguish real from fake, they risk acting on transactions that may never reach the chain, discouraging frontrunning attempts.
-
-#### 3.1 Transactions get forwarded to MEV Blocker connected Searchers & Builders
-
-Transactions are shared with searchers for backrunning and sent directly to builders for the fastest inclusion.
- 
-### 4. Searchers provide Backrunning Bids for the flow
-
-After receiving the orders, searchers proceed to crunch their numbers and give their bundles back to MEV Blocker. Searchers are competing for the most profitable option and if they spot a backrun opportunity (real or fake), they submit a bundle to MEV Blocker RPC.
-
-The searcher that provides the bundle with the highest rebate value for users gets selected as the winner (NOT the searcher that pays the highest fee to the validator).
-
-### 5. Searcher bundles get forwarded to builders to be included in the next block
-
-In this step, the MEV Blocker system gathers all the searcher bundles, discards those containing fake transactions, and attaches the user signatures back to the transactions. 
-
-In order to have their bundles forwarded to builders, searchers bid an arbitrary amount denominated in ETH. In theory, searchers have an internal valuation of the bundle's backrun value that is larger than their bid — otherwise they wouldn't bid at all. 
-
-Once the builder has selected a searcher bundle bid, they are obligated to refund 90% of that bid's value to the user and use the remaining 10% to pay the validator/proposer. 
-  
-
-### 6. MEV Blocker Txs Assembly
-
-MEV Blocker discards bundles with fake transactions, forwarding only real ones. It also re-adds the transaction signature, preventing searchers from bypassing the system and ensuring MEV rebates reach users. The builder selects the bundle with the highest kickback to the user for on-chain inclusion.
-
-### 7. Builders Receive Txs and Bundles
-
-Builders receive individual transactions and bundles from MEV Blocker. Per OFA rules, they must replace any bundle with a higher-paying one during block-building. They also execute a transaction that pays 90% of the backrun value to the user. Unlike per-transaction fee models, MEV Blocker’s per-block fee lets builders prioritize inclusion speed and backrun generation without transaction-level cost concerns.
-
-* If the highest paying bundle no longer simulates correctly on the top of the block (e.g. because the submitted transaction route is no longer available), a lower paying bid can still be included. This ensures that users get the highest possible reward without delayed execution (it's also possible for a user to get multiple refunds in a single block).
-
-### 8. Transaction Inclusion Onchain
-
-Builders execute the user transaction, backruns, and MEV refund, which is automatically sent to tx.origin or the designated address. This ensures users and order flow providers receive 100% of the refund, with MEV Blocker taking no cut.
-
-### 9. Final: MEV Blocker Gas Rebates for Orderflow Originators
-
-MEV Blocker provides gas rebates to order flow providers by redistributing 90% of builder subscription fees that are attributable to the orderflow originator.
-
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/API-reference/Cancelling-transactions.md b/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/API-reference/Cancelling-transactions.md
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--- a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/API-reference/Cancelling-transactions.md
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----
-sidebar_position: 10 
----
-
-# Set Up Free Cancellation
-
-Set `softCancellations=true` in the URL and then send a transaction to self with the same nonce as the one you want to cancel.
-
-
-:::note
-
-This will stop MEV Blocker from broadcasting your previous transaction (it may still get included in rare conditions if it has been broadcasted before). This can be enabled only on `/noreverts` or `/fullprivacy` endpoints, soft cancellations won't work on `/fast` (the default).
-
-:::
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/API-reference/Sending-transactions.md b/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/API-reference/Sending-transactions.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 70e19513a..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/API-reference/Sending-transactions.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,254 +0,0 @@
----
-sidebar_position: 9
----
-
-# Sending transactions
-
-MEV Blocker  supports sending transactions via the standard eth_sendRawTransaction method through its multiple endpoints. If you prefer sending to a custom endpoint instead of the default, you can find the list of available endpoints here.
-
-## eth_sendRawTransaction
-
-This is the recommended way to send transactions.
-
-Example of a request:
-
-```jsx
-
-curl https://rpc.mevblocker.io/fast
-  -X POST
-  -H "Content-Type: application/json"
-  -d '{
-  "jsonrpc":"2.0",
-"method":"eth_sendRawTransaction",
-  "params":["0xf869018203e882520894f17f52151ebef6c7334fad080c5704d77216b732881bc16d674ec80000801ba02da1c48b670996dcb1f447ef9ef00b33033c48a4fe938f420bec3e56bfd24071a062e0aa78a81bf0290afbc3a9d8e9a068e6d74caa66c5e0fa8a46deaae96b0833"],
-  "id":1
-}
-```
-
-Example of a response:
-
-```jsx
-{
- "id": 1,
- "jsonrpc": "2.0",
- "result": "0xe670ec64341771606e55d6b4ca35a1a6b75ee3d5145a99d05921026d1527331"
-}
-```
-
-## eth_getTransactionByHash
-
-This RPC method mimics the standard eth_getTransactionByHash for private transactions.
-
-Example of a request:
-
-```jsx
-curl https://rpc.mevblocker.io/fast
-  -X POST
-  -H "Content-Type: application/json"
-  -d '{
-	"jsonrpc": "2.0", 
-	"method": "eth_getTransactionByHash", 
-	"params": ["0xbb3a336e3f823ec18197f1e13ee875700f08f03e2cab75f0d0b118dabb44cba0"], // your_tx_hash 
-	"id": 1
-}
-```
-
-Our transaction response closely follows the format of the standard eth_getTransactionByHash method used in Ethereum. However, in our response, the fields gasPrice, v, r, and s are set to "0x0". 
-
-Example of a response:
-
-```jsx
-{
-  "id": 1,
-  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
-  "result": {
-    "accessList": [],
-    "blockHash": "0x0155db99111f10086bad292d3bd0be9472aff9cf0f33d7d35f2db4814ffad0f6",
-    "blockNumber": "0x112418d",
-    "chainId": "0x1",
-    "from": "0xe2a467bfe1e1bedcdf1343d3a45f60c50e988696",
-    "gas": "0x3c546",
-    "gasPrice": "0x20706def53",
-    "hash": "0xce0aadd04968e21f569167570011abc8bc17de49d4ae3aed9476de9e03facff9",
-    "input": "0xb6f9de9500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000080000000000000000000000000e2a467bfe1e1bedcdf1343d3a45f60c50e9886960000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000064e54a3b0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002000000000000000000000000c02aaa39b223fe8d0a0e5c4f27ead9083c756cc2000000000000000000000000de15b9919539113a1930d3eed5088cd10338abb5",
-    "maxFeePerGas": "0x22b05d8efd",
-    "maxPriorityFeePerGas": "0x1bf08eb000",
-    "nonce": "0x12c",
-    "r": "0x0",
-    "s": "0x0",
-    "to": "0x7a250d5630b4cf539739df2c5dacb4c659f2488d",
-    "transactionIndex": "0x0",
-    "type": "0x2",
-    "v": "0x0",
-    "value": "0x2c68af0bb140000",
-    "yParity": "0x1"
-  }
-}
-```
-
-## eth_getTransactionCount
-
-This method implements the standard eth_getTransactionCount. If using the pending parameter instead of a block number, the private mempool will automatically compute the next nonce using both private transactions and public transactions.
-
-Example of a request:
-
-```jsx
-curl https://rpc.mevblocker.io/fast
-  -X POST
-  -H "Content-Type: application/json"
-  -d '{
-	"jsonrpc": "2.0", 
-	"method": "eth_getTransactionCount", 
-	"params": 
-			[
-			"0xc94770007dda54cF92009BFF0dE90c06F603a09f", 
-			"0x5bad55"
-			], 
-	"id": 1
-}
-```
-
-Example of response:
-
-```jsx
-{
-  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
-  "id": 1,
-  "result": "0x1a"
-}
-```
-
-## eth_sendPrivateTransaction
-
-This method is not supported since the method eth_sendRawTransaction never shares transactions inside the public mempool anyway, and this all received transactions are private by definition.
-
-## eth_cancelTransaction
-
-MEV Blocker provides a best-effort transaction cancellation feature. While we will notify all participating builders not to process the transaction, we cannot fully guarantee that the transaction will not be mined, particularly if the cancellation request is made close to the slot's end time.
-
-To cancel a transaction, you can use the eth_cancelTransaction method via your MEV Blocker RPC:
-
-```jsx
-{
-{
-    jsonrpc: "2.0",
-    id: 1,
-    method: "eth_cancelTransaction",
-    params: [
-        // The hash of the transaction to be cancelled
-        "0xb8101baf6bfd31243578e8847c12316f47318f567b02296fdf7fc783bef74826"
-    ]
-}
-```
-
-A successfull response will return true:
-
-```jsx
-{
-{
-    id: 1,
-    result: true,
-}
-```
-
-## mev_sendBundle
-
-mev_sendBundle uses a new bundle format to send bundles to MEV-Share. See the Understanding Bundles page for more information, or check out the Sending Bundles page for a short guide.
-
-example request:
-
-```jsx
-curl https://rpc.mevblocker.io/fast
-  -X POST
-  -H "Content-Type: application/json"
-  -d '{
-    "params": [
-    {
-      "version": "v0.1",
-      "inclusion": {
-        "block": "0x8b8da8",
-        "maxBlock": "0x8b8dab"
-      },
-      "body": [
-        {
-          "tx": "0x02f880058201d685e9103fda0085e9103fda368255f0940000c335bc9d5d1af0402cad63fa7f258363d71a8092696d206261636b72756e6e69696969696e67c080a0c5058ccf5759e29d4ad28e038f632a9b6269bbb0644c61447e0f14d56c453d73a048e877ee621c4b6be1234a8ad84379e80d45b288a7271e2b1aede7a04f06fd98",
-          "canRevert": false
-        }
-      ],
-      "validity": {
-        "refund": [],
-        "refundConfig": []
-      }
-    }
-  ],
-  "method": "mev_sendBundle",
-  "id": 1,
-  "jsonrpc": "2.0"
-}'
-```
-
-example response:
-
-```jsx
-{
-    "jsonrpc": "2.0", 
-    "id": 1, 
-    "result": 
-        {"bundleHash": "0x0"}
-}
-```
-
-## eth_callMany
-
-eth_callMany can be used to simulate a bundle against a specific block number, including simulating a bundle at the top of the next block. The eth_callMany RPC has the following payload format:
-
-```jsx
-{
-  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
-  "id": 1,
-  "method": "eth_callMany",
-  "params": [
-    {
-      txs,               // Array[String], A list of signed transactions to execute in an atomic bundle
-      blockNumber,       // String, a hex encoded block number for which this bundle is valid on
-      stateBlockNumber,  // String, either a hex encoded number or a block tag for which state to base this simulation on. Can use "latest"
-      timestamp,         // (Optional) Number, the timestamp to use for this bundle simulation, in seconds since the unix epoch
-    }
-  ]
-}
-```
-
-example:
-
-```jsx
-curl https://rpc.mevblocker.io/fast
-  -X POST
-  -H "Content-Type: application/json"
-  -d '{
-    "jsonrpc":"2.0",
-    "method":"eth_callMany",
-    "params":[[{
-        "transactions":     
-        [{
-            "from":"0xDAFEA492D9c6733ae3d56b7Ed1ADB60692c98Bc5",
-            "to":"0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7",
-            "gas":"0x92c0",
-            "gasPrice":"0x7896e72a000",
-            "value":"0x0",
-            "data":"0x70a0823100000000000000000000000047ac0fb4f2d84898e4d9e7b4dab3c24507a6d503"}],
-            "blockOverride":
-                    {"blockNumber":"0xe39dd0"}}],
-                          {"blockNumber":"0x103434E",
-                                                  "transactionIndex":234}],"id":1}'
-```
-
-example response:
-
-```jsx
- {
-     "jsonrpc":"2.0",
-     "id":1,
-     "result":[[{
-         "value":"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000470de54da7138"
-             }]]}
-```
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/API-reference/Transactions-status.md b/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/API-reference/Transactions-status.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 40b575885..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/API-reference/Transactions-status.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
----
-sidebar_position: 11
----
-
-# Transaction Status
-
-MEV Blocker offers an API to keep track of transactions and their attached auctions. To learn about the status of a transaction, you can use the following URL:
-
-```jsx
-https://rpc.mevblocker.io/tx/Your_Tx_Hash
-```
-
-Note that transaction status can also be fetched via eth_getTransactionByHash.
-
-INPUTS
-
-```jsx
-{
-	"status": " The status of the submitted txs. Value can be INCLUDED / FAILED / UNKNOWN",
-	"hash": "The hash of the submitted transactions",
-	"rpc_timestamp": "The timestamp at which the transaction was received",
-	"transaction":
-		{
-			"from": "The sender of the transaction",
-			"to": "The receiver of the transaction",
-			"gas": "The amount of gas used for the transaction",
-			"nonce": "The nonce of the transaction",
-			"value": ""
-		},
-	"fastMode": "If the transaction was shared through the fast endpoint",
-	"shared": "If the transaction was shared with searchers",
-	"simulationError": "If the transaction gave an error simulating it",
-	"backruns": "How many backruns bid did we receive for the tx",
-	"referrer": "Where is the transaction originating from. If full, field will shopw string used my integrator ( ie CoWSwap) and if empty, it will show No Referrer",
-	"refundRecipient": "To which address is the backrun being sent to. If empty, the backrun is sent to tx.orign",
-	"refund": "Amount of ETH searchers were able to rebate via backrun"
-}
-```
-
-Example of a transaction
-
-```jsx
-{
-	"status": "UNKNOWN", 
-	"hash": "0xb4b11a74ca505a8225226f1cc6e1662ce83298a7b4364e5ca5bad1049cc05d2b", 
-	"rpc_timestamp": null, 
-	"transaction": 
-		{
-			"from": "", 
-			"to": "", 
-			"gas": "", 
-			"nonce": "", 
-			"value": ""
-		}, 
-	"fastMode": true, 
-	"shared": false, 
-	"simulationError": null, 
-	"backruns": 0, 
-	"referrer": null, 
-	"refundRecipient": null, 
-	"refund": 0.0
-}
-```
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/API-reference/analytics.md b/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/API-reference/analytics.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 28d19c89d..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/API-reference/analytics.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
----
-sidebar_position: 12
----
-
-# Custom Referrer
-
-In order for you to have custom analytics on your flow, you need to set up a “referrer” in the transaction status field.
-
-When submitting your transaction to the API, define the custom parameter `referrer=xxx` to associate transactions on MEV Blocker's transaction origin analytics dashboard to your project:
-
-```jsx
-https://rpc.mevblocker.io/?referrer=(PROJECT_NAME/PROJECT_NICKNAME/YOUR_ADDRESS)
-```
-
-By setting up a referrer tag, you allow the MEV Blocker team to more easily track the order flow you create and to more easily detect and fix issues. Additionally, it is much easier for the MEV Blocker team to create personalized dashboards based on your flow. If you wish to have a custom dashboard please contact us.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/API-reference/configuring-fee-recipient-address.md b/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/API-reference/configuring-fee-recipient-address.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 28b590541..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/API-reference/configuring-fee-recipient-address.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
----
-sidebar_position: 13
----
-
-# Custom Beneficiary
-
-When submitting your transaction to the API, use the custom parameter `refundRecipient` to define a different wallet address from the transaction originator address for receiving the rebate:
-
-```jsx
-https://rpc.mevblocker.io/?refundRecipient=(YOUR_ADDRESS)
-```
-
-note
-
-Without this setup, by default, rebates are sent back to users (`tx.origin`)
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Endpoints.md b/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Endpoints.md
deleted file mode 100644
index bde5c46b1..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Endpoints.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
----
-sidebar_position: 1
----
-
-# Endpoints
-
-MEV Blocker users can choose from several different endpoints depending on their particular needs.
-
-![The Best Protection Under the Sun](/img/mevblocker/endpointsProtection.png)
-
-[**Fast - https://rpc.mevblocker.io/fast**](https://rpc.mevblocker.io/fast) - Used to get transactions included on-chain as fast as possible while also finding users a rebate. _The transactions sent to this endpoint get simulated in pending block._
-
-```jsx
-https://rpc.mevblocker.io/fast
-```
-
-[**No Revert - https://rpc.mevblocker.io/noreverts**](https://rpc.mevblocker.io/noreverts) - Used to get transactions included on-chain without any possibility of reverting. If a transaction is no longer valid, it will stop being broadcast to builders at no extra cost to the user. _The transactions sent to this endpoint get simulated in pending block._
-
-```jsx
-https://rpc.mevblocker.io/noreverts
-```
-
-[**Full Privacy - https://rpc.mevblocker.io/fullprivacy**](https://rpc.mevblocker.io/fullprivacy) - Used to get transactions included on-chain directly via a builder. This method does not offer a rebate, but guarantees that the information a user's transaction carries remains private. Users should keep in mind that builders will still see their transaction information due to the architecture of PoS on Ethereum and can theoretically act maliciously. In theory, however, they shouldn't, as it's not in their interest. _The transactions sent to this endpoint get simulated in pending block._
-
-```jsx
-https://rpc.mevblocker.io/fullprivacy
-```
-
-[**Max Backruns - https://rpc.mevblocker.io/maxbackruns**](https://rpc.mevblocker.io/maxbackruns) - Used to get as many backruns for transactions as possible. This endpoint shares all received transactions with searchers no matter what. _The transactions sent to this endpoint get simulated in pending block._
-
-```jsx
-https://rpc.mevblocker.io/maxbackruns
-```
-
-[**No Checks - https://rpc.mevblocker.io/nochecks**](https://rpc.mevblocker.io/nochecks) - Used to let transactions go through the endpoint even if the simulation fails. This endpoint doesn't perform a transaction simulation in the pending block and only sends private transactions (not bundles). _The transactions sent to this endpoint DO NOT Get simulated in pending block._
-
-```jsx
-https://rpc.mevblocker.io/nochecks
-```
-
-## Restricted Searcher Configuration
-
-As you might have read in ##concepts, MEV Blocker shares transaction information with all permissionlessly connected searchers because it mixes real transactions with fake transactions. In the event of using "vanilla AMM swaps", the fake transactions are good enough to spoof searchers to not not know which of the transactions are real or fake. However, if you participate in more "advanced swaps protocols" such as CoW Swap, 1inch fusion, or Uniswap X, your solution might be a bit more complex than the "vanilla swaps", and hence the fake transactions might not be as good at spoofing real transaction information from searchers.
-
-Because of this, we enabled the option for you to choose between sharing the transactions with all permissionlessly connected searchers, for which we know nothing about, or to share the transactions with a curated list of searchers with whom the team might have a bit more background.\*
-
-\*Note that the absence of this parameter specific configuration makes all the flow go via the default endpoint
-
-For sharing with ALL connected searchers leverage this:
-
-```jsx
- - Endpoint_you_Choose - https://rpc.mevblocker.io/{your_chosen_endpoint}?shareAll=1
-```
-
-This endpoint forces RPC to share transactions publicly with all searchers that are permissionlessly connected to MEV Blocker.
-
-For sharing with CURATED connected searchers leverage this:
-
-```jsx
-- Endpoint_you_Choose - https://rpc.mevblocker.io/{your_chosen_endpoint}?shareSafe=1
-```
-
-This endpoints forces RPC to share transactions only with registered / curated searchers.
-
-## MEV Blocker Boost
-
-However, if you do not want to rely on MEV Blocker being up 100% of the time and failing to submit your transactions, you can leverage our Boost services which in the event of MEV Blocker RPC being down, forwards traffic to Flashbots RPC so that your transactions land on-chain.
-
-[**Fast - https://boost.rpc.mevblocker.io/fast**](https://rpc.mevblocker.io/fast) - Used to get transactions included on-chain as fast as possible while also finding users a rebate.
-
-```jsx
-https://boost.rpc.mevblocker.io/maxbackruns
-```
-
-[**No Revert - https://boost.rpc.mevblocker.io/noreverts**](https://boost.rpc.mevblocker.io/noreverts) - Used to get transactions included onchain without any possibility of reverting. If a transaction is no longer valid, it will stop being broadcast to builders at no extra cost to the user. _The transactions sent to this endpoint get simulated in pending block._
-
-```jsx
-https://boost.rpc.mevblocker.io/noreverts
-```
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Integrators/Intent_applications.md b/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Integrators/Intent_applications.md
deleted file mode 100644
index f468625ac..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Integrators/Intent_applications.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
----
-sidebar_position: 7
----
-
-# Intent Based dApps
-
-Intent-based DEXs, such as CoW Protocol, utilize an off-chain competition among solvers to secure better settlement prices for their users. These solvers, tasked with identifying the most efficient transaction paths, are responsible for submitting transactions on-chain on the user's behalf.
-
-MEV Blocker serves as a critical tool for safeguarding these transactions from manipulation by MEV bots. By integrating MEV Blocker, solvers ensure their transactions are protected from frontrunning and sandwich attacks, while also benefiting from additional guarantees such as no reverts. Moreover, solvers can capture up to 90% of the backrun value their transactions might generate, thereby creating an alternative revenue stream beyond the solver competition.
-
-## Integrating MEV Blocker
-
-MEV Blocker was built for effortless integration — just switch your app or wallet’s RPC endpoint to ours and you're good to go.
-
-Our infrastructure mirrors the standard Ethereum RPC spec, so no special setup or code changes are needed.
-
-MEV Blocker is fully permissionless. You can start using our endpoints right away — no signup, no gatekeeping. If you ever need help or want to reach the team, join us on Telegram.
-
-## Integration Steps
-
-1. **Choose Your Endpoint**
-Decide which MEV Blocker endpoint suits your use case best. Refer to our Endpoints section to learn how each variant works and what differences they offer.
-
- 2. **Customize Your Setup**
-Add your own referrer ID for analytics and set a custom beneficiary address to receive rebates. Details are available in our customization sections.
-
-3. **Swap Your RPC URL**
-Update your current RPC endpoint to:
-
-```jsx
-https://rpc.mevblocker.io
-```
-
-4. **Track Your Activity**
-Want visibility into flows, usage, and rewards? Ping us on [Telegram](https://t.me/mevblocker) — we’ll help you set up a custom Dune dashboard to transparently track everything.
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Integrators/Oracles.md b/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Integrators/Oracles.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 01d8e6482..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Integrators/Oracles.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
----
-sidebar_position: 4
----
-
-# Oracles (OEV)
-
-Oracle Extractable Value (OEV) is a type of MEV that arises whenever an Oracle updates its data feed on the blockchain via the public mempool.
-
-With MEV Blocker, Oracles can sidestep the public mempool, directing data feed updates to a private mempool where bots compete to arbitrage the forecasted state changes. This approach allows Oracles to retain up to 90% of the value generated by the update, in contrast to the public mempool model where this value is typically captured by MEV bots and validators.
-
-## Integrating MEV Blocker
-
-MEV Blocker was built for effortless integration — just switch your app or wallet’s RPC endpoint to ours and you're good to go.
-
-Our infrastructure mirrors the standard Ethereum RPC spec, so no special setup or code changes are needed.
-
-MEV Blocker is fully permissionless. You can start using our endpoints right away — no signup, no gatekeeping. If you ever need help or want to reach the team, join us on Telegram.
-
-## Integration Steps
-
-1. **Choose Your Endpoint**
-Decide which MEV Blocker endpoint suits your use case best. Refer to our Endpoints section to learn how each variant works and what differences they offer.
-
- 2. **Customize Your Setup**
-Add your own referrer ID for analytics and set a custom beneficiary address to receive rebates. Details are available in our customization sections.
-
-3. **Swap Your RPC URL**
-Update your current RPC endpoint to:
-
-```jsx
-https://rpc.mevblocker.io
-```
-
-4. **Track Your Activity**
-Want visibility into flows, usage, and rewards? Ping us on Telegram — we’ll help you set up a custom Dune dashboard to transparently track everything.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Integrators/Relayers.md b/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Integrators/Relayers.md
deleted file mode 100644
index e27684825..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Integrators/Relayers.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
----
-sidebar_position: 5
----
-
-# Relayers - Bundlers - Paymasters
-
-Transaction relayers, such as Gelato, enable projects and users to bypass the complexities of on-chain transaction submission and gas management. These relayers facilitate transaction submissions on behalf of the projects and users according to predetermined preferences.
-
-By using MEV Blocker, transaction relayers can guarantee their transactions are free from MEV, and can even capture value in cases where backrunning opportunities are present.
-
-## Integrating MEV Blocker
-
-MEV Blocker was built for effortless integration — just switch your app or wallet’s RPC endpoint to ours and you're good to go.
-
-Our infrastructure mirrors the standard Ethereum RPC spec, so no special setup or code changes are needed.
-
-MEV Blocker is fully permissionless. You can start using our endpoints right away — no signup, no gatekeeping. If you ever need help or want to reach the team, join us on Telegram.
-
-## Integration Steps
-
-1. **Choose Your Endpoint**
-Decide which MEV Blocker endpoint suits your use case best. Refer to our Endpoints section to learn how each variant works and what differences they offer.
-
- 2. **Customize Your Setup**
-Add your own referrer ID for analytics and set a custom beneficiary address to receive rebates. Details are available in our customization sections.
-
-3. **Swap Your RPC URL**
-Update your current RPC endpoint to:
-
-```jsx
-https://rpc.mevblocker.io
-```
-
-4. **Track Your Activity**
-Want visibility into flows, usage, and rewards? Ping us on Telegram — we’ll help you set up a custom Dune dashboard to transparently track everything.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Integrators/Solvers.md b/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Integrators/Solvers.md
deleted file mode 100644
index d506f8cd3..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Integrators/Solvers.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
----
-sidebar_position: 3
----
-
-## Integrating MEV Blocker
-
-MEV Blocker was built for effortless integration — just switch your app or wallet’s RPC endpoint to ours and you're good to go.
-
-Our infrastructure mirrors the standard Ethereum RPC spec, so no special setup or code changes are needed.
-
-MEV Blocker is fully permissionless. You can start using our endpoints right away — no signup, no gatekeeping. If you ever need help or want to reach the team, join us on Telegram.
-
-## Integration Steps
-
-1. **Choose Your Endpoint**
-Decide which MEV Blocker endpoint suits your use case best. Refer to our Endpoints section to learn how each variant works and what differences they offer.
-
- 2. **Customize Your Setup**
-Add your own referrer ID for analytics and set a custom beneficiary address to receive rebates. Details are available in our customization sections.
-
-3. **Swap Your RPC URL**
-Update your current RPC endpoint to:
-
-```jsx
-https://rpc.mevblocker.io
-```
-
-4. **Track Your Activity**
-Want visibility into flows, usage, and rewards? Ping us on Telegram — we’ll help you set up a custom Dune dashboard to transparently track everything.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Integrators/Telegram Bots.md b/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Integrators/Telegram Bots.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 87bb452b2..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Integrators/Telegram Bots.md	
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
----
-sidebar_position: 6
----
-
-## Integrating MEV Blocker
-
-MEV Blocker was built for effortless integration — just switch your app or wallet’s RPC endpoint to ours and you're good to go.
-
-Our infrastructure mirrors the standard Ethereum RPC spec, so no special setup or code changes are needed.
-
-MEV Blocker is fully permissionless. You can start using our endpoints right away — no signup, no gatekeeping. If you ever need help or want to reach the team, join us on Telegram.
-
-## Integration Steps
-
-1. **Choose Your Endpoint**
-Decide which MEV Blocker endpoint suits your use case best. Refer to our Endpoints section to learn how each variant works and what differences they offer.
-
- 2. **Customize Your Setup**
-Add your own referrer ID for analytics and set a custom beneficiary address to receive rebates. Details are available in our customization sections.
-
-3. **Swap Your RPC URL**
-Update your current RPC endpoint to:
-
-```jsx
-https://rpc.mevblocker.io
-```
-
-4. **Track Your Activity**
-Want visibility into flows, usage, and rewards? Ping us on Telegram — we’ll help you set up a custom Dune dashboard to transparently track everything.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Integrators/Wallets.md b/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Integrators/Wallets.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 201055518..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Integrators/Wallets.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
----
-sidebar_position: 2
----
-
-# Wallets 
-
-MEV Blocker’s RPC private mempool is a monetization solution that is highly customizable for Wallets. While there are many customizable settings, the default settings are sensible: we guarantee privacy while offering the fastest submission and highest rebates across all RPCs in the market. (See study results)
-
-## Integrating MEV Blocker
-
-MEV Blocker was built for effortless integration — just switch your app or wallet’s RPC endpoint to ours and you're good to go.
-
-Our infrastructure mirrors the standard Ethereum RPC spec, so no special setup or code changes are needed.
-
-MEV Blocker is fully permissionless. You can start using our endpoints right away — no signup, no gatekeeping. If you ever need help or want to reach the team, join us on Telegram.
-
-## Integration Steps
-
-1. **Choose Your Endpoint**
-Decide which MEV Blocker endpoint suits your use case best. Refer to our Endpoints section to learn how each variant works and what differences they offer.
-
- 2. **Customize Your Setup**
-Add your own referrer ID for analytics and set a custom beneficiary address to receive rebates. Details are available in our customization sections.
-
-3. **Swap Your RPC URL**
-Update your current RPC endpoint to:
-
-```jsx
-https://rpc.mevblocker.io
-```
-
-4. **Track Your Activity**
-Want visibility into flows, usage, and rewards? Ping us on Telegram — we’ll help you set up a custom Dune dashboard to transparently track everything.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Users/Metamask.md b/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Users/Metamask.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 8f5da566b..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Users/Metamask.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
----
-sidebar_position: 1
----
-
-# Metamask Wallet 
-
-
-
-## Desktop Browser Wallet 
-
-![Guide](/img/mevblocker/Metamask_1_optimized.png)
-![Guide](/img/mevblocker/Metamask_2_optimized.png)
-![Guide](/img/mevblocker/Metamask_3_optimized.png)
-![Guide](/img/mevblocker/Metamask_4_optimized.png)
-![Guide](/img/mevblocker/Metamask_5_optimized.png)
-![Guide](/img/mevblocker/Metamask_6_optimized.png)
-![Guide](/img/mevblocker/Metamask_7_optimized.png)
-![Guide](/img/mevblocker/Metamask_8_optimized.png)
- 
-## Mobile Wallet 
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Users/README.mdx b/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Users/README.mdx
deleted file mode 100644
index 6bc5f7e1a..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Users/README.mdx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
----
-sidebar_position: 2
----
-# Individual Users
-
-Individual users are also able to connect to MEV Blocker RPC by updating their Wallet's RPC. The way in which you are able to do this varies from wallet to wallet. 
-
-*Note that you may also want to pick a specific endpoint instead of default one. Check MEV Blockers Endpoints here
-
-## Manually add the RPC
-
-**Network Name:** MEV Blocker RPC
-
-**RPC URL:** 
-
-```jsx
-https://rpc.mevblocker.io/
-```
-
-**Chain ID:** 1 
-
-**Currency Symbol:** ETH 
-
-**Block Explorer:** https://etherscan.io
-
-### If your wallet does not support custom RPCs, reach out to them and tell them to either integrate directly MEV Blocker or to allow for custom RPC.
-
-import DocCardList from '@theme/DocCardList';
-
-<DocCardList />
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Users/rabby.md b/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Users/rabby.md
deleted file mode 100644
index dadaef755..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Users/rabby.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
----
-sidebar_position: 2
----
-
-# Rabby Wallet 
-
-## Desktop Wallet 
-
-![Guide](/img/mevblocker/Rabby_1_optimized.png)
-![Guide](/img/mevblocker/Rabby_2_optimized.png)
-![Guide](/img/mevblocker/Rabby_3_optimized.png)
-![Guide](/img/mevblocker/Rabby_4_optimized.png)
-![Guide](/img/mevblocker/Rabby_5_optimized.png)
-![Guide](/img/mevblocker/Rabby_6_optimized.png)
-
-
-## Mobile Wallet 
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Users/rainbow.md b/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Users/rainbow.md
deleted file mode 100644
index e49e3767b..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Users/rainbow.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
----
-sidebar_position: 4
----
-
-# Rainbow Wallet 
-
-## Desktop Wallet 
-
-![Guide](/img/mevblocker/Rainbow_1_optimized.png)
-![Guide](/img/mevblocker/Rainbow_2_optimized.png)
-![Guide](/img/mevblocker/Rainbow_3_optimized.png)
-![Guide](/img/mevblocker/Rainbow_4_optimized.png)
-![Guide](/img/mevblocker/Rainbow_5_optimized.png)
-![Guide](/img/mevblocker/Rainbow_6_optimized.png)
-![Guide](/img/mevblocker/Rainbow_7_optimized.png)
-
-## Mobile Wallet 
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/_category_.json b/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/_category_.json
deleted file mode 100644
index d18a778fb..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/_category_.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-{
-    "position": 2,
-    "label": "Order Flow Originators",
-    "collapsible": true,
-    "collapsed": true
-}
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/rpc-performance/README.mdx b/docs/mevblocker/rpc-performance/README.mdx
deleted file mode 100644
index 2fd2571b8..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/rpc-performance/README.mdx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Performance Benchmark
-
-In the following [paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2505.19708), we perform
-an empirical comparison of four major MEV protection RPCs—MEV Blocker, Flashbots,
-Blink, and Merkle—by evaluating their execution quality for the exact same transactions.
-Through a systematic analysis of transaction outcomes, we examine how their different OFA
-designs impact user benefits, shedding light on how order flow providers should carefully
-pay attention to marketing claims and thoroughly review to whom they are sending their
-transactions to.
-
-From these comparisons, we can rank each RPC service provider based on the different
-metrics. MEV Blocker stands out for being the only RPC that is either the best or among
-the best in all metrics. Flashbot ranks similarly or just below MEV blocker in time to
-inclusion and backrun value. However, its execution price is the lowest among all RPCs.
-Finally Merkle and Blink both generate very low rebates. Also, Merkle stands out for its
-low success rate.
-
-![Guide](/img/mevblocker/mevblocker_comparison.png)
-
-If you want to dig deeper on the study, make sure to read each of the categories of the study, or alternativly here is the full paper:
-
-### [Private MEV Protection RPCs: Benchmark Study](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2505.19708).
-
-
-
-import DocCardList from '@theme/DocCardList';
-
-<DocCardList />
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/rpc-performance/_category_.json b/docs/mevblocker/rpc-performance/_category_.json
deleted file mode 100644
index a309ce35f..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/rpc-performance/_category_.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-{
-    "position": 5,
-    "label": "Performance Benchmark",
-    "collapsible": true,
-    "collapsed": true
-}
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/rpc-performance/backrunning.md b/docs/mevblocker/rpc-performance/backrunning.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 929cba9b1..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/rpc-performance/backrunning.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
----
-sidebar_position: 1
----
-
-# Backrun Quality 
-
-First, we measure the backruns generated by the RPCs:
-
-![Backrun](/img/mevblocker/Backruns_1.png)
-
-We follow a similar methodology as for swap price improvements: we compare between each RPC solution and MEV Blocker, and only consider swaps that landed on-chain both via MEV blocker and via at least another RPC.
-
-We plot a similar box plot as previously. The first plot represents the average backrun, and its distribution for all the transactions. The second plot only includes transactions where one of them (MEV Blocker or the RPC) has a non-0 backrun.
-
-The swaps can be classified in 2 categories: very liquid pairs (ETH-USDC) and less liquid pairs (ETH-GNO, ETH-COW, and ETH-AAVE). The liquid pairs did not generate any backruns, which leads to many 0 values. Indeed, for these pairs there is enough liquidity so that one trade of reasonable size does not unbalance the pool enough to create an arbitrage opportunity. Additionally, even the less liquid pairs don’t generate backruns every time. Therefore, we plot the values with and without the transactions with no backrun. For this analysis, we find that MEV Blocker’s backruns are larger than any other RPCs solutions with more than 10\% confidence.
-
-However, if we look at the backruns received by the users, the values are different as Blink and Merkle don’t send these backruns back to the user:
-
-![Backrun](/img/mevblocker/Backruns_2.png)
-
-The comparison between MEV Blocker and Flashbots remains unchanged, because both RPCs send 100\% of the rebates to their users. However, we can conclude that MEV Blocker and Flashbots are better for the users than Merkl and Blink, in terms of rebates value.
-
-![Backrun](/img/mevblocker/Backruns_3.png)
-![Backrun](/img/mevblocker/Backruns_4.png)
-![Backrun](/img/mevblocker/Backruns_5.png)
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/rpc-performance/inclusion-speed.md b/docs/mevblocker/rpc-performance/inclusion-speed.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 91b79528e..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/rpc-performance/inclusion-speed.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
----
-sidebar_position: 2
----
-
-# Inclusion Speed
-
-We now consider the number of blocks between submission and inclusion for the transactions
-which were successfully executed on-chain. Here, we consider all the successful transactions
-for each RPC provider, as defined for the success rate.
-
-![Speed](/img/mevblocker/ispeed_1.png)
-
-We plot the box plot of the distribution to time to inclusion (measured in number of blocks),
-with the minimum, the 10th percentile, the average, the 90th percentile and the maximum
-value. represents the standard deviation of the each set.
-
-We notice that the mean and standard deviation rank the RPC service providers in the same
-order. This transaction sample demonstrates that MEV Blocker has the fastest execution, followed by
-Flashbots, then Blink and finally Merkle.
-
-Flashbot’s execution shows a single large outlier with a time to inclusion of 7 blocks, where
-the second largest is 4 blocks. This value does not significantly affect the mean and standard
-deviation, as the sample size is significant enough to compensate for it. With this detail
-accounted for, the box plot shows consistent performance results.
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/rpc-performance/price-improvement.md b/docs/mevblocker/rpc-performance/price-improvement.md
deleted file mode 100644
index c23d675f7..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/rpc-performance/price-improvement.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
----
-sidebar_position: 3
----
-
-# Swap Price Improvement
-
-Then, we focus only on the swaps and start by observing the quality of the execution which
-can be measured by the relative price of the swap between the different executions. Here,
-we compare each RPC service to MEV Blocker, when both have executed the swap. For
-every trade, we compute price improvement = price(RPC)/price(MEV Blocker) -1, and we
-measure it in bps. This can be rewritten price improvement = output(RPC)/output(MEV
-Blocker) -1, with output the amount of tokens received from the swap. Both formulas are
-similar because the inputs of the transactions are identical. The results show that on average
-Mev Blocker performs better than all other RPCs: it is on average 9bps better than Blink
-and Merkle, and 21 bps better than Flashbots.
-
-We also check the statistical significance of our results by performing a t-test with “H0: price improvement = 0”. Intuitively, the p-value computed by this test represents the probability that, in truth, there is no difference between MEV blocker and the comparison RPC, and therefore the difference we measure in our data is purely random noise. This probability is
-below 10% for Flashbot, meaning that the difference between MEV blocker and Flashbot is
-statistically significant at the 10% level. The difference between MEV blocker and the other
-2 RPCs instead is not significant at any standard significance level.
-
-![priceImprovement](/img/mevblocker/price_improvement_1.png)
-
-
-![priceImprovement](/img/mevblocker/price_improvement_2.png)
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/rpc-performance/success-reate.md b/docs/mevblocker/rpc-performance/success-reate.md
deleted file mode 100644
index c0087532f..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/rpc-performance/success-reate.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
----
-sidebar_position: 4
----
-
-# Success Rate
-
-We define the success rate as the number of transactions that were successfully executed
-on-chain divided by the number of transactions submitted through an RPC. This implies
-that all transactions which landed on-chain but reverted are considered as unsuccessful.
-Out of the 273 transactions submitted, MEV Blocker, Blink and Flashbots successfully
-executed their transactions with a rate of exceeding 90%, while Merkle’s success rate was
-lower at 74We assign one color to each RPC that we’ll keep for the following plots.
-
-![successRate](/img/mevblocker/success_rate_1.png)
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/searchers/API Reference/cancel_bundle.md b/docs/mevblocker/searchers/API Reference/cancel_bundle.md
deleted file mode 100644
index c2bbdf328..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/searchers/API Reference/cancel_bundle.md	
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-# eth_cancelBundle
-
-Clarification for eth_cancelBundle we support only receiving empty bundle with uuid they want to cancel.
-
-we'll broadcast both eth_cancelBundle and eth_sendBundle to all connected builders with that uuid
-
-Example of request
-
-```jsx
-{
-  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
-  "id": 1,
-  "method": "eth_cancelBundle",
-  "params": [
-    {
-      "replacementUuid": "mevblocker",   // String, any arbitrary string that can be used to replace or cancel this bundle
-    }
-  ]
-}
-```
-
-Example response
-
-```jsx
-{
-    "id": 1,
-    "jsonrpc": "2.0",
-    "result": 200
-}
-```
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/searchers/API Reference/send_bundle.md b/docs/mevblocker/searchers/API Reference/send_bundle.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 9d0843bf1..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/searchers/API Reference/send_bundle.md	
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
----
-sidebar_position: 3
----
-
-# eth_sendBundle
-
-Example Request
-
-```jsx
-{
-  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
-  "id": 1,
-  "method": "eth_sendBundle",
-  "params": [
-    {
-      "txs": [
-        "txHash", // originator transaction
-        "rawTxHex" // searcher transaction
-      ],
-      "blockNumber": "0x102286B",       // (Optional) String, a hex-encoded block number for which this bundle is valid. Default, current block number
-      "replacementUuid": "blinklabsxyz",   // (Optional) String, any arbitrary string that can be used to replace or cancel this bundle
-    }
-  ]
-}
-```
-
-Example Response
-
-```jsx
-{
-    "id": 1,
-    "jsonrpc": "2.0",
-    "result": "0x164d7d41f24b7f333af3b4a70b690cf93f636227165ea2b699fbb7eed09c46c7"
-}
-```
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/searchers/README.mdx b/docs/mevblocker/searchers/README.mdx
deleted file mode 100644
index d6ab6d67b..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/searchers/README.mdx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-# Searchers
-
-If you are interested in searching on MEV Blockers, you simply need to connect to our websocket to start backruning! MEV Blocker private mempool broadcasts an auction for every transaction it receives on the “backrunnable endpoints”. The auction reveals certain parts of the transaction that searchers can use to post a backrun bid.
-
-Searchers looking to connect to MEV Blocker’s open marketplace on Ethereum will need to understand the following sections.
-
-* Listen to transactions
-* Bid on Transactions
-
-The above methods are for backrunning general flow for MEV Blocker, however, there is also the possibility of backruning CoW Swap flow. In order to do so, and because of the itnriquises and complexity of CoW Swaps solver settlements, Searchers need to be whitelisted.
-
-There are two ways to get whitelisted:
-
-* Meritocracy → become one of the best searchers on MEV Blocker and we will contact you via [Telegram](https://t.me/mevblocker) to whitelist your address
-* Go through a KYC process → Please reach out via [contact@](mailto:@mevblocker.io) or [Telegram](https://t.me/mevblocker) to get whitelisted and to get access to the CoW Swap’s websocket for biding on transactions.
-
-import DocCardList from '@theme/DocCardList';
-
-<DocCardList />
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/searchers/_category_.json b/docs/mevblocker/searchers/_category_.json
deleted file mode 100644
index 7e600ca9e..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/searchers/_category_.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-{
-    "position": 3,
-    "label": "Searchers",
-    "collapsible": true,
-    "collapsed": true
-}
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/searchers/bidding-on-transactions.md b/docs/mevblocker/searchers/bidding-on-transactions.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 62b0096af..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/searchers/bidding-on-transactions.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
----
-sidebar_position: 2
----
-# Bid on Transactions
-
-## How to send backrun bundles to MEV Blocker RPC
-
-Bids can be submitted by any client with the relay url: https://rpc.mevblocker.io. 
-
-However, you need to make sure that the first transaction of the bundle you send is the hash of the target transaction.
-
-Within the bundle itself, you need to make sure that the backrun transaction makes an ETH transfer that is paying via transfer or just transaction priority fees (coinbase tx of the block), and the value of the transfer has to be the bid amount.
-
-To recap, a bundle has 2 transactions:
-
-- The hash of the target transaction
-- Your backrun - the backrun must pay the fee_recipient the bid with an Ether transfer
-
-Construct a back-run bundle just like you would for a target transaction from the mempool, but make the first element of the txs array in params of `eth_sendBundle` the hash of the pending target, instead of the fully-encoded transaction.
-
-:::note
-
-The pending target transaction must be the first transaction in txs, and only one target transaction can be included per bundle, otherwise the request will be rejected. It is still possible to submit multiple bundles for the same block, containing different target transactions.
-
-:::
-
-Send the back-run bundle to the same websocket connection using the `eth_sendBundle` method
-
-:::tip
-
-`replacementUuid` is supported in this version of `eth_sendBundle`
-
-:::
-
-```json
-{ 
-    "jsonrpc": "2.0", 
-    "id": 1, 
-    "method": "eth_sendBundle", 
-    "params": 
-        [ 
-            { "txs": [ // this is the 32-byte transaction hash of the target transaction "0xfec1700ef24c9ff6fd2e07584a16bbb2fec1700ef24c9ff6fd2e07584a16bbb2", // this is your signed encoded transaction "0xabc123.." ], 
-            "blockNumber": "0xb63dcd", 
-            "minTimestamp": 0,
-            "maxTimestamp": 1615920932 
-            } 
-        ] 
-}
-```
-
-:::note
-
-Historical submitted bundles, including those that did not land on-chain, will not only be shared with builders but also archived and presented to the public for transparency.
-
-:::
-
-Connect to the websocket server located at searchers.mevblocker.io
-
-```shell
-websocat wss://searchers.mevblocker.io
-```
-
-Use the `eth_subscribe` method to subscribe to unsigned pending transactions - `mevblocker_partialPendingTransactions`:
-
-
-```json
-{"method":"eth_subscribe","params": ["mevblocker_partialPendingTransactions"]}
-```
-
-Response:
-
-```json
-{
-        "jsonrpc": "2.0", 
-        "id": 1, 
-        "result": "0xd58bbbc0f5190962eff01b6f0ec17724"
-}
-```
-
-You'll start receiving unsigned pending transactions (missing `v`, `r`, and `s`):
-
-```json
-{
-    "jsonrpc": "2.0", 
-    "method": "eth_subscription", 
-    "params": 
-        {"subscription": "0xd58bbbc0f5190962eff01b6f0ec17724", 
-        "result": 
-            {"chainId": "0x1", 
-            "to": "0x6215589d293fdf52886484f46f0d6a11c76b4a7e", 
-            "value": "0x4fefa17b724000",
-            "data": "0x", 
-            "accessList": [], 
-            "nonce": "0x10", 
-            "maxPriorityFeePerGas": "0x0", 
-            "maxFeePerGas": "0x7e1c65b04", 
-            "gas": "0x5208", 
-            "type": "0x2", 
-            "hash": "0x5f08dd372fce1a44dda27bed60ca036acb4979fad6ca37b9c388e351a870fe4c", 
-            "from": "0xcb1588f3f7e92a1278c68a6aed4bdcbc68534b29"
-            }
-        }
-}
-```
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/searchers/listening-for-transactions.md b/docs/mevblocker/searchers/listening-for-transactions.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 8d01c6e6d..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/searchers/listening-for-transactions.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
----
-sidebar_position: 1
----
-# Listen to Transactions
-
-## How to receive unsigned pending transactions
-
-:::note
-
-Historical submitted bundles, including those that did not land on-chain, will not only be shared with builders but also archived and presented to the public for transparency.
-
-:::
-
-Connect to the websocket server located at searchers.mevblocker.io
-
-```shell
-websocat wss://searchers.mevblocker.io
-```
-## Connecting
-Use the `eth_subscribe` method to subscribe to unsigned pending transactions - `mevblocker_partialPendingTransactions`:
-
-```json
-{"method":"eth_subscribe","params":["mevblocker_partialPendingTransactions"]}
-```
-
-## Response:
-
-```json
-{
- "jsonrpc": "2.0", 
- "id": 1, 
- "result": "0xd58bbbc0f5190962eff01b6f0ec17724"
-}
-```
-
-You'll start receiving unsigned pending transactions (missing `v`, `r`, and `s`):
-
-```json
-{
- "jsonrpc": "2.0", 
- "method": "eth_subscription", 
- "params": 
-    {
-        "subscription": "0xd58bbbc0f5190962eff01b6f0ec17724", 
-        "result": 
-            {
-                "chainId": "0x1", 
-                "to": "0x6215589d293fdf52886484f46f0d6a11c76b4a7e", 
-                "value": "0x4fefa17b724000", 
-                "data": "0x", 
-                "accessList": [], 
-                "nonce": "0x10", 
-                "maxPriorityFeePerGas": "0x0", 
-                "maxFeePerGas": "0x7e1c65b04", 
-                "gas": "0x5208", 
-                "type": "0x2", 
-                "hash": "0x5f08dd372fce1a44dda27bed60ca036acb4979fad6ca37b9c388e351a870fe4c", 
-                "from": "0xcb1588f3f7e92a1278c68a6aed4bdcbc68534b29"
-            }
-    }
-}
-```
-
diff --git a/docusaurus.config.ts b/docusaurus.config.ts
index 6ac049ba6..bd77f26fd 100644
--- a/docusaurus.config.ts
+++ b/docusaurus.config.ts
@@ -48,6 +48,30 @@ const config: Config = {
         docs: {
           routeBasePath: '/',
           sidebarPath: require.resolve('./sidebars.js'),
+          sidebarItemsGenerator: async (args: any) => {
+            const items = await args.defaultSidebarItemsGenerator(args)
+
+            const hasMevblockerDocs = (item: any): boolean => {
+              if (item.type === 'doc') {
+                return item.id.startsWith('mevblocker/')
+              }
+              if (item.type === 'category') {
+                return item.items.some(hasMevblockerDocs)
+              }
+              return false
+            }
+
+            return items.map((item) => {
+              if (item.type === 'category' && hasMevblockerDocs(item)) {
+                return {
+                  type: 'doc',
+                  label: item.label ?? '🏖️ MEV Blocker',
+                  id: 'mevblocker/README',
+                }
+              }
+              return item
+            })
+          },
           remarkPlugins: [
             remarkMath,
             [require('@docusaurus/remark-plugin-npm2yarn'), { sync: true, converters: ['yarn', 'pnpm'] }],
diff --git a/src/components/MevBlockerInterstitial.module.css b/src/components/MevBlockerInterstitial.module.css
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..21b712c9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/components/MevBlockerInterstitial.module.css
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+ .card {
+   width: min(640px, 100%);
+   margin: 0;
+   background: #ffffff;
+   border-radius: 28px;
+   box-shadow: 0 24px 60px rgba(96, 62, 45, 0.18);
+   padding: 40px 40px 36px;
+   color: #1b1b1b;
+   font-family: "Onest", "Trebuchet MS", "Segoe UI", sans-serif;
+ }
+
+ .tag {
+   display: inline-flex;
+   align-items: center;
+   gap: 10px;
+   background: #f3d5c7;
+   color: #d4552c;
+   text-transform: uppercase;
+   letter-spacing: 0.08em;
+   font-weight: 700;
+   font-size: 12px;
+   padding: 8px 16px;
+   border-radius: 999px;
+ }
+
+ .title {
+   margin: 22px 0 12px;
+   font-size: clamp(32px, 4vw, 46px);
+   line-height: 1.06;
+   font-weight: 800;
+ }
+
+ .text {
+   margin: 0 0 14px;
+   font-size: 18px;
+   line-height: 1.5;
+   color: #6e5e54;
+ }
+
+ .countdown {
+   font-weight: 600;
+   color: #1b1b1b;
+ }
+
+ .button {
+   display: inline-flex;
+   align-items: center;
+   justify-content: center;
+   margin-top: 16px;
+   padding: 14px 28px;
+   background: #d4552c;
+   color: #ffffff;
+   font-weight: 700;
+   font-size: 18px;
+   border-radius: 999px;
+   text-decoration: none;
+   transition: transform 160ms ease, box-shadow 160ms ease;
+   box-shadow: 0 12px 24px rgba(212, 85, 44, 0.3);
+   text-align: center;
+ }
+
+ .button:hover,
+ .button:focus {
+   transform: translateY(-1px);
+   box-shadow: 0 16px 28px rgba(212, 85, 44, 0.38);
+   background: #b94724;
+   color: #ffffff;
+   text-decoration: none;
+ }
+
+ .fallback {
+   margin-top: 18px;
+   font-size: 16px;
+   color: #6e5e54;
+ }
+
+ .fallbackLink {
+   color: #1f5aa6;
+   font-weight: 600;
+ }
+
+ .fallbackLink:hover,
+ .fallbackLink:focus {
+   color: #b94724;
+ }
+
+ @media (max-width: 520px) {
+   .card {
+     padding: 32px 24px 30px;
+   }
+
+   .button {
+     width: 100%;
+   }
+ }
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/src/components/MevBlockerInterstitial.tsx b/src/components/MevBlockerInterstitial.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..663c693df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/components/MevBlockerInterstitial.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+import React, { useEffect, useState } from 'react'
+import Head from '@docusaurus/Head'
+
+import styles from './MevBlockerInterstitial.module.css'
+
+const REDIRECT_URL = 'https://docs.mevblocker.io/'
+const DELAY_SECONDS = 10
+
+const MevBlockerInterstitial = () => {
+  const [remaining, setRemaining] = useState(DELAY_SECONDS)
+
+  useEffect(() => {
+    const intervalId = window.setInterval(() => {
+      setRemaining((prev) => {
+        if (prev <= 1) {
+          window.location.replace(REDIRECT_URL)
+          return 0
+        }
+        return prev - 1
+      })
+    }, 1000)
+
+    const timeoutId = window.setTimeout(() => {
+      window.location.replace(REDIRECT_URL)
+    }, DELAY_SECONDS * 1000)
+
+    return () => {
+      window.clearInterval(intervalId)
+      window.clearTimeout(timeoutId)
+    }
+  }, [])
+
+  const secondLabel = remaining === 1 ? 'second' : 'seconds'
+
+  return (
+    <>
+      <Head>
+        <meta httpEquiv="refresh" content={`${DELAY_SECONDS}; url=${REDIRECT_URL}`} />
+        <link rel="canonical" href={REDIRECT_URL} />
+        <link rel="preconnect" href="https://fonts.googleapis.com" />
+        <link rel="preconnect" href="https://fonts.gstatic.com" crossOrigin="anonymous" />
+        <link
+          href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Onest:wght@400;600;700;800&display=swap"
+          rel="stylesheet"
+        />
+        <title>MEV Blocker Update</title>
+      </Head>
+      <main className={styles.page}>
+        <section className={styles.card} role="main">
+          <span className={styles.tag}>MEV Blocker Update</span>
+          <h1 className={styles.title}>MEV Blocker has been acquired.</h1>
+          <p className={styles.text}>We are redirecting you to the new home.</p>
+          <p className={styles.countdown} aria-live="polite">
+            Redirecting you in {remaining} {secondLabel}.
+          </p>
+          <a className={styles.button} href={REDIRECT_URL}>
+            Go to docs.mevblocker.io now
+          </a>
+          <p className={styles.fallback}>
+            If you are not redirected{' '}
+            <a className={styles.fallbackLink} href={REDIRECT_URL}>
+              click here
+            </a>
+            .
+          </p>
+        </section>
+      </main>
+    </>
+  )
+}
+
+export default MevBlockerInterstitial
diff --git a/src/theme/NotFound/index.tsx b/src/theme/NotFound/index.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3b94a5600
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/theme/NotFound/index.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+import React, { useEffect } from 'react'
+import { useLocation } from '@docusaurus/router'
+import OriginalNotFound from '@theme-original/NotFound'
+
+const MEV_PREFIX = '/mevblocker/'
+const MEV_REDIRECT = '/mevblocker'
+
+const NotFound = (props: React.ComponentProps<typeof OriginalNotFound>) => {
+  const { pathname } = useLocation()
+  const shouldRedirect = pathname.startsWith(MEV_PREFIX)
+
+  useEffect(() => {
+    if (shouldRedirect) {
+      window.location.replace(MEV_REDIRECT)
+    }
+  }, [shouldRedirect])
+
+  if (shouldRedirect) {
+    return (
+      <main className="container margin-vert--xl">
+        <h1>Redirecting...</h1>
+        <p>
+          This content has moved. Taking you to <a href={MEV_REDIRECT}>/mevblocker</a>.
+        </p>
+      </main>
+    )
+  }
+
+  return <OriginalNotFound {...props} />
+}
+
+export default NotFound
diff --git a/vercel.json b/vercel.json
index 8872f9550..6cd7f0a0d 100644
--- a/vercel.json
+++ b/vercel.json
@@ -2,6 +2,11 @@
     "cleanUrls": true,
     "buildCommand": "npm install -g pnpm && yarn build",
     "redirects": [
+        {
+            "source": "/mevblocker/(.+)",
+            "destination": "/mevblocker",
+            "statusCode": 301
+        },
         {
             "source": "/cow-sdk",
             "destination": "/cow-protocol/reference/sdks/cow-sdk",
@@ -1338,4 +1343,4 @@
             "statusCode": 301
         }
     ]
-}
\ No newline at end of file
+}

From 88b7a3ec60e18b5ca17d968f93b1caa502168fea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: fairlighteth <31534717+fairlighteth@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2026 16:19:18 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 02/11] chore: trigger deploy

---
 src/components/MevBlockerInterstitial.module.css | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/src/components/MevBlockerInterstitial.module.css b/src/components/MevBlockerInterstitial.module.css
index 21b712c9f..3633c147a 100644
--- a/src/components/MevBlockerInterstitial.module.css
+++ b/src/components/MevBlockerInterstitial.module.css
@@ -64,8 +64,8 @@
    transform: translateY(-1px);
    box-shadow: 0 16px 28px rgba(212, 85, 44, 0.38);
    background: #b94724;
-   color: #ffffff;
    text-decoration: none;
+   color: #ffffff;
  }
 
  .fallback {

From 37f6a16d6763be2c4de36f684b3945e9c80a4402 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: fairlighteth <31534717+fairlighteth@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2026 16:31:12 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 03/11] fix(docs): update MEV blocker fee documentation link
 for clarity

---
 docs/governance/fees/fees.md | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/docs/governance/fees/fees.md b/docs/governance/fees/fees.md
index 238241872..452daca95 100644
--- a/docs/governance/fees/fees.md
+++ b/docs/governance/fees/fees.md
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ sidebar_position: 3
 
 :::note
 
-This documentation refers to CoW Protocol fees. Builders connected to MEV blocker also pay a fee, which is discussed [here](/mevblocker/builders/fees/subscription-fees).
+This documentation refers to CoW Protocol fees. Builders connected to MEV blocker also pay a fee, which is discussed [here](/mevblocker).
 
 :::
 

From 7d426db0699f0fd586f4c68511129469781ee6b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: fairlighteth <31534717+fairlighteth@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2026 11:14:11 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 04/11] refactor(docs): streamline MEV Blocker documentation
 filtering logic

---
 docusaurus.config.ts | 11 +----------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/docusaurus.config.ts b/docusaurus.config.ts
index bd77f26fd..d71b73730 100644
--- a/docusaurus.config.ts
+++ b/docusaurus.config.ts
@@ -61,16 +61,7 @@ const config: Config = {
               return false
             }
 
-            return items.map((item) => {
-              if (item.type === 'category' && hasMevblockerDocs(item)) {
-                return {
-                  type: 'doc',
-                  label: item.label ?? '🏖️ MEV Blocker',
-                  id: 'mevblocker/README',
-                }
-              }
-              return item
-            })
+            return items.filter((item) => !hasMevblockerDocs(item))
           },
           remarkPlugins: [
             remarkMath,

From 0c683eee3c6b5c295595a71802f268368cb017e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: fairlighteth <31534717+fairlighteth@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2026 11:54:45 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 05/11] refactor(docs): remove MEV Blocker section from README
 for clarity

---
 docs/README.md | 4 ----
 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/docs/README.md b/docs/README.md
index 5d8351f71..04b8b4e85 100644
--- a/docs/README.md
+++ b/docs/README.md
@@ -13,10 +13,6 @@ Currently, CoW DAO's three main products are [**CoW Protocol**](cow-protocol), [
 
 CoW Protocol is a fully permissionless trading protocol that leverages [fair combinatorial batch auctions](cow-protocol/concepts/introduction/fair-combinatorial-auction) as its price finding mechanism. CoW Protocol uses fair combinatorial auctions to maximize liquidity via Coincidence of Wants (CoWs) in addition to tapping all available on-chain liquidity whenever needed.
 
-## What is [MEV Blocker](https://mevblocker.io)?
-
-MEV Blocker is an RPC endpoint designed to protect user transactions from MEV (Maximal Extractable Value) attacks such as frontrunning and sandwiching. Aside from protecting user transactions from the dangers of MEV, MEV Blocker leverages an order flow auction of searchers and builders to offer users rebates from backrunning for their trades.
-
 ## What is [CoW AMM](https://cow.fi/cow-amm)?
 
 CoW AMM is a new type of AMM built from the ground up to protect LPs from price exploitation in the form of [LVR](https://cow.fi/learn/what-is-loss-versus-rebalancing-lvr). Liquidity providers expect their tokens to earn yield, but most liquidity pools are actually not profitable after accounting for stale prices. Arbitrageurs exploit these stale prices at the expense of LPs. CoW AMM fixes LVR once and for all, with liquidity pools proven to outperform reference Balancer and Uniswap pools. 

From 25610b9f6ad7604d1c009251d7412a204e720490 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: fairlighteth <31534717+fairlighteth@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2026 12:23:04 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 06/11] refactor(docs): remove MEV Blocker reference from fees
 documentation for clarity

---
 docs/governance/fees/fees.md | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/docs/governance/fees/fees.md b/docs/governance/fees/fees.md
index 452daca95..9a1a1da87 100644
--- a/docs/governance/fees/fees.md
+++ b/docs/governance/fees/fees.md
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ sidebar_position: 3
 
 :::note
 
-This documentation refers to CoW Protocol fees. Builders connected to MEV blocker also pay a fee, which is discussed [here](/mevblocker).
+This documentation refers to CoW Protocol fees.
 
 :::
 

From 20cb8cf20f3b5241a75fd55885a7897dd8d53a9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: fairlighteth <31534717+fairlighteth@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2026 12:36:34 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 07/11] refactor(docs): remove MEV Blocker references from
 README and mission statement for clarity

---
 docs/README.md                  | 2 +-
 docs/governance/mission.md      | 2 +-
 docs/mevblocker/_category_.json | 6 ------
 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 docs/mevblocker/_category_.json

diff --git a/docs/README.md b/docs/README.md
index 04b8b4e85..2512e14e7 100644
--- a/docs/README.md
+++ b/docs/README.md
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ sidebar_position: 1
 
 CoW DAO is on a mission to innovate the most user-protective products in Ethereum. 
 
-Currently, CoW DAO's three main products are [**CoW Protocol**](cow-protocol), [**MEV Blocker**](https://mevblocker.io), and [CoW AMM](https://cow.fi/cow-amm), which it supports with development and marketing resources – including the [CoW Grants Program](https://grants.cow.fi), the [CoW Protocol Explorer](cow-protocol/tutorials/cow-explorer), and the [CoW Swap frontend](cow-protocol/tutorials/cow-swap).
+Currently, CoW DAO's three main products are [**CoW Protocol**](cow-protocol) and [CoW AMM](https://cow.fi/cow-amm), which it supports with development and marketing resources – including the [CoW Grants Program](https://grants.cow.fi), the [CoW Protocol Explorer](cow-protocol/tutorials/cow-explorer), and the [CoW Swap frontend](cow-protocol/tutorials/cow-swap).
 
 ## What is [CoW Protocol](cow-protocol)? 
 
diff --git a/docs/governance/mission.md b/docs/governance/mission.md
index 6706cd1da..ac1419684 100644
--- a/docs/governance/mission.md
+++ b/docs/governance/mission.md
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ sidebar_position: 1
 
 # Mission statement
 
-CoW DAO is an open organization of developers, market makers, and community contributors on a mission to create a fairer, more-protective financial system. CoW DAO currently supports CoW Swap, CoW Protocol and MEV Blocker – decentralized trading products that leverage order flow auctions to shield users from MEV attacks and give them more than they ask for.
+CoW DAO is an open organization of developers, market makers, and community contributors on a mission to create a fairer, more-protective financial system. CoW DAO currently supports CoW Swap and CoW Protocol – decentralized trading products that leverage order flow auctions to shield users from MEV attacks and give them more than they ask for.
 
 ## Vision
 
diff --git a/docs/mevblocker/_category_.json b/docs/mevblocker/_category_.json
deleted file mode 100644
index 447666015..000000000
--- a/docs/mevblocker/_category_.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-{
-    "position": 2,
-    "label": "🏖️ MEV Blocker",
-    "collapsible": true,
-    "collapsed": true
-}

From 450cf1525e0bc00888f003acd3d1baf2f1cbe6ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: fairlighteth <31534717+fairlighteth@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2026 14:03:11 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 08/11] refactor(docs): remove MEV Blocker references from
 documentation for clarity

---
 docusaurus.config.ts | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/docusaurus.config.ts b/docusaurus.config.ts
index d71b73730..74882b224 100644
--- a/docusaurus.config.ts
+++ b/docusaurus.config.ts
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ const config: Config = {
     metadata: [
       {
         name: 'description',
-        content: 'Documentation for CoW Protocol, CoW AMM, MEV blocker and other CoW DAO products.',
+        content: 'Documentation for CoW Protocol, CoW AMM and other CoW DAO products.',
       },
       { name: 'twitter:card', content: 'summary_large_image' },
       { name: 'og:type', content: 'website' },
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ const config: Config = {
       { name: 'og:title', content: 'Documentation - CoW DAO' },
       {
         name: 'og:description',
-        content: 'Documentation for CoW Protocol, CoW AMM, MEV blocker and other CoW DAO products.',
+        content: 'Documentation for CoW Protocol, CoW AMM and other CoW DAO products.',
       },
       { name: 'twitter:card', content: 'summary_large_image' },
       { name: 'twitter:site', content: '@CoWSwap' },

From 6239a53bc269a5f735b442990ccc250f5b8aadad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: fairlighteth <31534717+fairlighteth@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2026 14:03:45 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 09/11] refactor(docs): remove additional MEV Blocker
 references from vercel.json for clarity

---
 vercel.json | 55 -----------------------------------------------------
 1 file changed, 55 deletions(-)

diff --git a/vercel.json b/vercel.json
index 6cd7f0a0d..335a02573 100644
--- a/vercel.json
+++ b/vercel.json
@@ -1207,61 +1207,6 @@
             "destination": "/cow-protocol",
             "statusCode": 301
         },
-        {
-            "source": "/mevblocker/concepts/mev-concepts/sandwich-attacks",
-            "destination": "/mevblocker/concepts/MEV/MEV%20Attacks/sandwich-attacks",
-            "statusCode": 301
-        },
-        {
-            "source": "/mevblocker/concepts/mev-concepts/what-is-backrunning",
-            "destination": "/mevblocker/concepts/MEV/MEV%20Attacks/what-is-backrunning",
-            "statusCode": 301
-        },
-        {
-            "source": "/mevblocker/concepts/mev-concepts/what-is-frontrunning",
-            "destination": "/mevblocker/concepts/MEV/MEV%20Attacks/what-is-frontrunning",
-            "statusCode": 301
-        },
-        {
-            "source": "/mevblocker/usecases",
-            "destination": "/mevblocker",
-            "statusCode": 301
-        },
-        {
-            "source": "/mevblocker/users-and-integrators/integrators/analytics",
-            "destination": "/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/API-reference/analytics",
-            "statusCode": 301
-        },
-        {
-            "source": "/mevblocker/users-and-integrators/integrators/configuring-fee-recipient-address",
-            "destination": "/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/API-reference/configuring-fee-recipient-address",
-            "statusCode": 301
-        },
-        {
-            "source": "/mevblocker/users-and-integrators/integrators/setting-up-free-cancellations",
-            "destination": "/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/API-reference/Cancelling-transactions",
-            "statusCode": 301
-        },
-        {
-            "source": "/mevblocker/users-and-integrators/users/api",
-            "destination": "/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Endpoints",
-            "statusCode": 301
-        },
-        {
-            "source": "/mevblocker/users-and-integrators/users/available-endpoints",
-            "destination": "/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/Endpoints",
-            "statusCode": 301
-        },
-        {
-            "source": "/mevblocker/users-and-integrators/users/cancelling-transactions",
-            "destination": "/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/API-reference/Cancelling-transactions",
-            "statusCode": 301
-        },
-        {
-            "source": "/mevblocker/users-and-integrators/users/sending-transactions-via-rpc",
-            "destination": "/mevblocker/orderflow-originators/API-reference/Sending-transactions",
-            "statusCode": 301
-        },
         {
             "source": "/off-chain-services/in-depth-solver-specification/output-batch-auction-solutions",
             "destination": "/cow-protocol/reference/apis/solver",

From 1a176811cd19b02d5301355196b31f2800d84801 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: fairlighteth <31534717+fairlighteth@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2026 14:41:55 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 10/11] refactor(docs): enhance MEV Blocker documentation
 filtering logic to include link checks

---
 docusaurus.config.ts | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/docusaurus.config.ts b/docusaurus.config.ts
index 74882b224..b0fe17c87 100644
--- a/docusaurus.config.ts
+++ b/docusaurus.config.ts
@@ -56,7 +56,11 @@ const config: Config = {
                 return item.id.startsWith('mevblocker/')
               }
               if (item.type === 'category') {
-                return item.items.some(hasMevblockerDocs)
+                const linkIsMevblocker =
+                  item.link?.type === 'doc' &&
+                  typeof item.link.id === 'string' &&
+                  item.link.id.startsWith('mevblocker/')
+                return linkIsMevblocker || item.items.some(hasMevblockerDocs)
               }
               return false
             }

From b30d8c061f4a7b2caa3d26ce57c1889274646e56 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: fairlighteth <31534717+fairlighteth@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2026 14:43:39 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 11/11] refactor(docs): update README to reflect the current
 number of main products offered by CoW DAO

---
 docs/README.md | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/docs/README.md b/docs/README.md
index 2512e14e7..06b35aa49 100644
--- a/docs/README.md
+++ b/docs/README.md
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ sidebar_position: 1
 
 CoW DAO is on a mission to innovate the most user-protective products in Ethereum. 
 
-Currently, CoW DAO's three main products are [**CoW Protocol**](cow-protocol) and [CoW AMM](https://cow.fi/cow-amm), which it supports with development and marketing resources – including the [CoW Grants Program](https://grants.cow.fi), the [CoW Protocol Explorer](cow-protocol/tutorials/cow-explorer), and the [CoW Swap frontend](cow-protocol/tutorials/cow-swap).
+Currently, CoW DAO's two main products are [**CoW Protocol**](cow-protocol) and [CoW AMM](https://cow.fi/cow-amm), which it supports with development and marketing resources – including the [CoW Grants Program](https://grants.cow.fi), the [CoW Protocol Explorer](cow-protocol/tutorials/cow-explorer), and the [CoW Swap frontend](cow-protocol/tutorials/cow-swap).
 
 ## What is [CoW Protocol](cow-protocol)?